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Abstract. Emergence—macro-level ef-
fects from micro-level causes—is at the 
heart of the conflict between reduction-
ism and functionalism. How can there be 
autonomous higher level laws of nature 
(the functionalist claim) if everything 
can be reduced to the fundamental forces 
of physics (the reductionist position)? 
We cut through this debate by applying a 
computer science lens to the way we 
view nature. We conclude (a) that what 
functionalism calls the special sciences 
(sciences other than physics) do indeed 
study autonomous laws and furthermore 
that those laws pertain to real higher 
level entities but (b) that interactions 
among such higher-level entities is epi-
phenomenal in that they can always be 
reduced to primitive physical forces. In 
other words, epiphenomena, which we 
will identify with emergent phenomena, 
do real higher-level work. The proposed 
perspective provides a framework for 
understanding many thorny issues in-
cluding the nature of entities, stigmergy, 
the evolution of complexity, phase tran-
sitions, supervenience, and downward 
entailment. We also discuss some practi-
cal considerations pertaining to systems 
of systems and the limitations of model-
ing.
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1 Introduction 
Although the field of complex systems is 
relatively young, the sense of the term 
emergence that is commonly associated 
with it—that micro phenomena often 
give rise to macro phenomena1—has 
been in use for well over a century. The 
article on Emergent Properties in the 
valuable online Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy [O'Connor] begins as fol-
lows.  
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In a 1998 book-length perspective on his 
life’s work [Holland], John Holland, the 
inventor of genetic algorithms and one 
of the founders of the field of complex 
systems, offered an admirably honest ac-
count of the state of our understanding 
of emergence. 
+  , 
  % 
'  , 
% -%  +
&  
 %  

In a review of Holland’s book, Cosma 
Shalizi wrote the following. 
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  Recently the term multiscale has gained favor as a 
less mysterious-sounding way to refer to this 
macro-micro interplay. The fact that multiscale 
sounds more scientific, however, does not reflect a 
correspondingly clearer understanding of the phe-
nomenon itself. 
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The preceding is a poetic echo of the po-
sition expressed in a landmark paper 
[Anderson] by Philip Anderson when he 
distinguished reductionism from what he 
called the constructionist hypothesis,  
with which he disagrees, which holds 
that the 
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In a statement that is strikingly consis-
tent with the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy “common understanding” of 
emergence offered above, Anderson ex-
plained his anti-constructionist position.  
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2
  Shalizi also offers his own definition of emergence 
on his website [Shalizi] as follows. 
One set of variables, A, emerges from another, B if 
(1) A is a function of B, i.e., at a higher level of 
abstraction, and (2) the higher-level variables can 
be predicted more efficiently than the lower-level 
ones, where "efficiency of prediction" is defined 
using information theory. 
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Although not so labeled, the preceding 
provides a good summary of the position 
known as functionalism (or in other con-
texts as non-reductive physicalism), 
which argues that autonomous laws of 
nature appear at many levels.  
Anderson thought that the position he 
was taking was radical enough—how 
can one be a reductionist, which he 
claimed to be, and at the same time ar-
gue that there are autonomous sci-
ences—that it was important to reaffirm 
his adherence to reductionism. He 
summed this up as follows. 
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In the rest of this paper, we elaborate 
and extend the position that Anderson 
set forth. We hope to offer a coherent 
explanation for how nature can be both 
reductive and non-reductive simultane-
ously.  
Much of our approach is derived from 
concepts borrowed from Computer Sci-
ence—which more than any other hu-
man endeavor has had to deal, on the 
most concrete terms, with the question 
of how one can operate on many levels 
simultaneously. How is it possible for 
such the amazing panoply of functional-
ity created by software to emerge from 
(nothing but) electrons in motion? 
The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. 
• Section 2 develops basic concepts. It 
explores the notions of reductionism 
and functionalism, and it characterizes 
their differences and points of agree-
ment. It defines the term epiphenome-
non. It explicates the notion of super-
venience and points out an important 
limitation. It argues that one must 
chose between force reductionism and 
the position that new forces of nature 
come into being mysteriously. 
• Section 3 uses the Game of Life to il-
lustrate and then to define emergence. 
• Section 4 explores some of the impli-
cations of our definition. It defines the 
notion of downward entailment. It dis-
cusses the reality of higher level ab-
stractions, and it offers a novel view of 
phase transitions. 
• Section 5 defines the notion of an en-
tity as a persistent region of reduced 
entropy. It relates the concepts of enti-
ties, dissipative structures, and auton-
omy. It shows why emergence is a 
fundamental feature of nature. It dis-
tinguishes natural from artificial 
autonomous entities. It shows why su-
pervenience is not as powerful a con-
cept as one might have hoped. It dis-
cusses the conceptual limitations 
Computer Science suffers as a result of 
its self-imposed exile to a world of free 
energy. 
• Section 6 discusses stigmergy, histori-
cal contingency, and the evolution of 
complexity. 
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• Section 7 presents additional implica-
tions for science of entities, emer-
gence, and complexity. 
• Section 8 presents a framework for the 
varieties of emergence that we discuss. 
• Section 9 offers some practical advice. 
about service-oriented architectures, 
stove-piped systems, and the limita-
tions of modeling. 
• Section 10 provides brief a summary 
and includes a remark about an area 
for future investigation. 
• The Appendix offers a formal defini-
tion of Games of Life patterns such as 
the glider. It shows how such patterns 
can be used to create an API of pat-
terns. It presents some basic unsolva-
bility results. 
2 Background and founda-
tions 
We begin by contrasting reductionism 
and functionalism. We use papers writ-
ten by Steven Weinberg, a reductionist 
physicist, and Jerrold (Jerry) Fodor, a 
functionalist philosopher, as our points 
of departure.  
• Weinberg, a professor of physics at 
the University of Texas, Austin, was 
awarded the Nobel prize in physics 
for his work on unifying the weak 
and electromagnetic forces. He is an 
articulate spokesperson for a con-
structivist-like form of reductionism, 
the position that all of science can be 
reduced to and are mathematical 
consequences of the laws of physics. 
He presented his views in “Reduc-
tionism Redux” [Weinberg], an es-
say in which he responded to posi-
tion papers of participants in a debate 
on reductionism held in 1992 at Je-
sus College, Cambridge University.  
• Fodor, a professor of philosophy at 
Rutgers, is one of the founders of 
functionalism, the position that regu-
larities appear at all levels of science 
and that these regularities are not re-
ducible to physics. He reviewed [Fo-
dor 98] his position in “Special Sci-
ences; Still Autonomous after All 
These Years,” which he wrote in re-
ply to a more reductionist position 
taken [Kim ’92, ‘93] by Jaegwon 
Kim, a professor of philosophy at 
Brown University. 
In the end we will claim that it was nei-
ther the reductionist Weinberg nor the 
functionalist Fodor but Anderson—who 
proposed a marriage between reduction-
ism and functionalism—who was right.3 
Our job will be to show how the improb-
able couple can live happily ever after. 
2.1 Functionalism 
Functionalism [Fodor 74] holds that 
there are so-called ‘special sciences’ (in 
fact, all sciences other than physics and 
perhaps chemistry) that study regulari-
ties in nature that are in some sense 
autonomous of physics. In [Fodor 98] 
Fodor wrote the following reaffirmation 
of functionalism.  
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  All of the extracts from Anderson, Fodor, and 
Weinberg are from the three papers cited above. 
The emphases in the extracts are all in the origi-
nals.  
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Although Fodor does not use the term, 
the phenomena studied by the special 
sciences are the same sort of phenomena 
that we now call multiscale, i.e., emer-
gent.  
Why is there emergence? Fodor contin-
ues as follows. 
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So, like Holland, Fodor throws up his 
hands with respect to explaining emer-
gence. 
One of the tenets of functionalism is that 
within any domain, it is the regularities 
that appear at the level of phenomena 
with which the domain is concerned that 
are important. It is not significant how 
those regularities are realized in terms of 
lower level phenomena—both because 
that doesn’t matter and because they can 
often be implemented in any of a num-
ber of ways. A term commonly used in 
Functionalism is multiple realizability, 
which refers to the notion that many 
regularities (many functions) can be re-
alized in multiple ways. As Fodor re-
marks, 
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2.2 Reductionism 
Taking the other side of the debate is 
Steven Weinberg, one of the most articu-
late defenders of reductionism. Wein-
berg distinguishes two kinds of reduc-
tionism. 
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Weinberg continues his explication of 
grand reductionism by using the weather 
as an example.  
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Thus the battle is joined: are the higher 
level sciences derived from physics? 
Before approaching this question, it is 
reasonable to ask whether any common 
ground exists between reductionism and 
functionalism? To do that, we first ex-
amine the concepts of epiphenomena 
and supervenience. Then we explore the 
status of the fundamental forces of phys-
ics and the possibility of the emergence 
of higher level forces. Finally we look at 
the role the environment and historical 
accidents play in both reductionism and 
functionalism. 
2.3 Epiphenomena 
If one doesn’t already have a sense of 
what it means, the term epiphenomenon 
is quite difficult to understand. Here is 
the WordNet  definition [WordNet], 
which is representative. 
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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It is not clear that this definition pins 
much down. This definition is especially 
troublesome because the terms secon-
dary and by-product should not be inter-
preted to mean that an epiphenomenon is 
separate from and a consequence of the 
state of affairs characterized by the 
“other” phenomenon.  
We suggest that a better way to think of 
an epiphenomenon is as an alternative 
way of apprehending or perceiving a 
given state of affairs. Consider Brownian 
motion, which appears to be motion that 
very small particles of non-organic ma-
terials are able to engage in on their 
own. Before Einstein, Brownian motion 
was a mystery. How could inanimate 
matter move on its own? We now know 
that Brownian motion is an epiphe-
nomenon of collisions of particles with 
atoms or molecules.  
With this usage of epiphenomenon as a 
guide we define an epiphenomenon as a 
phenomenon that can be described 
(sometimes formally but sometimes only 
informally) in terms that do not depend 
on the underlying phenomena from 
which it emerges.4 
                                                 
4
  We use the term emerges advisedly. We will soon 
define emergent and epiphenomenal to be syno-
nyms. 
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This is familiar territory for Engineering 
and Computer Science. Requirements 
and specifications are by intention writ-
ten in terms that do not depend on the 
design or implementation of the systems 
that realize them. Requirements are writ-
ten before systems are designed, and 
specifications are intended specifically 
to be implementation-independent.  
Although use of the term epiphenomena 
in this context sounds strange, a re-
quirements document or a system speci-
fication is intended to describe epiphe-
nomena of systems that satisfy those re-
quirements or that meet that specifica-
tion.5 
Even though we just claimed that a 
specification describes epiphenomena, 
our notion of epiphenomena is not the 
same as the notion of functionality. 
From our perspective epiphenomena ex-
ist only when there is an implementa-
tion. Epiphenomena are, first of all, phe-
nomena. A specification for a system 
that did not exist would not describe 
epiphenomena. It would describe the 
epiphenomena of any system that satis-
fies that specification, but that’s as far as 
one could go. From our perspective, 
there are no epiphenomena unless they 
are epiphenomena of something. That is 
not the case with functionality, which is 
understood in the abstract. 
It is reasonable to say that the function-
ality of most executing software is 
epiphenomenal. The computation con-
sidered as an abstraction may be defined 
independently of the implementation. 
But the only real action is at the very 
lowest level. No matter how abstract 
one’s software, one can always stop a 
                                                 
5
  We are not holding our breath waiting for a con-
tracting officer to refer to a system’s inadequate 
epiphenomena. 
computation by pulling the plug on the 
computer. The computation as an ab-
stract epiphenomenon exists only be-
cause electrons are actually flowing. 
2.4 Supervenience 
A closely related term from the philoso-
phical literature is supervenience. The 
intended use of this term is to relate a 
presumably higher level set of predicates 
or properties6 (call this set H for higher) 
to a presumably lower level set of predi-
cates or properties (call this set L for 
lower). The properties or predicates in H 
and L are all presumed to be applicable 
to some common domain of discourse. 
H and L are each ways of characterizing 
the state of affairs of the underlying do-
main. For any particular state of affairs 
in the domain of discourse, the predi-
cates in H and L will each be either true 
or false (or perhaps not applicable). 
One says that H supervenes on (or over) 
L if it is never7 the case that two states of 
affairs will assign the same configura-
tion of values to the elements of L but 
different configuration of values to the 
elements of H. In other words when a 
state of affairs assigns values to predi-
cates in L, that fixes the assignments of 
values to predicates of H. 
Consider the following simple example. 
Let the domain be a sequence of n bits. 
Let L be the statements: bit 1 is on; bit 2 
is on; etc. Let H be statements of the 
                                                 
6
  Since properties (e.g., the color of an object) may 
be expressed in terms of predicates about that 
property, from here on we will speak only of 
predicates. 
7
  Some definitions require that not only is it never 
the case, it never can be the case. It does make a 
formal difference whether we base supervenience 
on a logical impossibility or on empirical facts. 
We finesse that distinction by adopting the rule of 
thumb of fundamental particle physicists: if some-
thing can happen it will. 
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sort: exactly 5 bits are on; an even num-
ber of bits are on; no two successive bits 
are on; the bits that are on form the ini-
tial values in the Fibonacci sequence; 
etc.  
H supervenes on L since any configura-
tion of values of the statements in L de-
termines the values of the statements in 
H.  
However, if we remove one of the 
statements from L, e.g., we don’t include 
in L a statement about bit 3, but we leave 
the statements in H alone, then H does 
not supervene on L.  
To see why, consider the H statement 
 h1: an even number of bits is on. 
For concreteness, let’s assume that there 
are exactly 5 bits. Let’s assume first, as 
in the first line of Figure 1, that all the 
bits except bit 3, the one for which there 
is no L statement, are on. Thus since 
there is no L statement about bit 3, all 
the L statements are true even though bit 
3 is off.  Since 4 of the 5 bits are on, h1 
is also true.   
Now, assume that bit 3 is on as in the 
second line of Figure 1.  All the L state-
ments are still true.  But since 5 bits are 
now on, h1 is now false. 
Since we have found an H statement that 
has two different values for a single con-
figuration of values of the L statements, 
H does not supervene over L. 
Although we have not attempted to trace 
its history, the notion of supervenience 
may have originated as an attempt to 
capture the relationship between epiphe-
nomena and their underlying phenom-
ena. Presumably epiphenomena super-
vene on underlying phenomena: distinct 
epiphenomena must be associated with 
distinct underlying phenomena, which is 
what one wants.8 You can’t get two dif-
ferent sets of epiphenomena from the 
same underlying phenomena.9 
Note that the reverse is not true. Two 
different states of the underlying phe-
nomena may result in the same epiphe-
nomena. In our bit example, there are 
many different ways in which an even 
number of bits may be on.  
The position known as supervenience 
physicalism might be understood as 
claiming that any higher-level descrip-
tion of nature supervenes over some set 
of primitive descriptions.  
It would appear that the relationship de-
fined by supervenience will be useful in 
analyzing multi-scale phenomena. To 
some extent this is the case. When we 
consider autonomous entities, however, 
we shall see that supervenience is not as 
useful as one might have hoped. This is 
one reason that emergence has been so 
difficult to pin down.  
One reason that supervenience is less 
useful than one might have hoped may 
be related to the difficulty one encoun-
ters when using supervenience for infi-
nite domains. Consider our bit example 
again, but imagine that we have a count-
ably infinite number of bits. Consider 
the H statement  
                                                 
8
  On the other hand, searches for the phrase 
“epiphenomena supervene” on Google, Yahoo 
msn.com, and AskJeeves conducted on 9/17/2005 
found no references—other than to an online draft 
of this paper. This suggests that none of these ser-
vices had ever scanned a document that contained 
the sentence fragment “… epiphenomena super-
vene over  … .”   
9
  It’s not really the epiphenomena that supervene 
over their underlying phenomena. It’s statements 
about the epiphenomena or properties of the 
epiphenomena that supervene over statements 
about the underlying phenomena or their proper-
ties. As a short-hand, however, we will talk about 
epiphenomena as supervening (or not) over under-
lying phenomena. 
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h2: the bits that are on are prime. 
 Clearly the H set consisting solely of h2 
supervenes over the entire set of L 
statements. Just as clearly, that H set 
does not supervene over any proper sub-
set of the L statements, and certainly not 
over any finite subset of the L state-
ments—one needs to look at all of the 
bits to determine whether it is exactly 
the prime bits that are on.  
So even though we can conclude that H, 
which contains a single relatively simple 
statement, supervenes over the infinite 
set of statements in L, that information 
doesn’t buy us much. On the contrary, 
supervenience of this sort is like describ-
ing a tapestry by enumerating the threads 
that make it up. The epiphenomena are 
lost. We will see another example of this 
later. 
2.5 Fundamental forces and 
strong emergence 
Returning to Weinberg and Fodor, pre-
sumably both would agree that phenom-
ena of the special sciences supervene on 
phenomena in physics. A given set of 
phenomena at the level of fundamental 
physics is associated with no more than 
one set of phenomena at the level of any 
of the special sciences. Or looking top-
down, two different states of affairs in 
some special science must be associated 
with two different states of affairs at the 
level of fundamental physics. Superven-
ience of this sort seems to correspond 
more or less to Weinberg’s petty reduc-
tionism, a doctrine that he finds of only 
minor importance. So perhaps agreement 
at this level is not very significant. 
Where Weinberg and Fodor disagree is 
not about supervenience but about 
whether the principles of the special sci-
ences can be derived from the principles 
of physics. 
That disagreement aside, we do have a 
fundamental area of agreement—which 
has some quite significant implications. 
Weinberg makes his case sarcastically.  
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What I believe Weinberg is getting at is 
that the current standard model of phys-
ics postulates four elementary forces: the 
strong force, the weak force, the elec-
tromagnetic force, and gravity. Since 
Weinberg’s Nobel prize was for his 
work on unifying the weak and electro-
magnetic force, perhaps one should say 
there are only three fundamental forces. 
Either way, what’s important is that ac-
cording to physics there is a small fixed 
number of fundamental forces. I doubt 
that Fodor would disagree. 
Weinberg’s sarcastic reference to a life 
force is an implicit criticism of an obso-
lete strain of thinking about emergence. 
The notion of vitalism—the emergence 
of life from lifeless chemicals—
postulates a new force of nature that ap-
pears at the level of biology and that is 
not reducible to lower level phenomena. 
Emergence of this sort is what Bedau 
[Bedau] has labeled “strong emergence.” 
As Bedau also points out, no one takes 
this kind of emergence seriously.  
It is worth noting, however, that even 
were evidence of strong emergence to be 
found, science would not shrivel up and 
die. Dark energy, the apparently extra 
force that seems to be pushing the Uni-
verse to expand may be a new force of 
nature.  
Furthermore, even if other (spooky) 
forces of nature like vitalism were (mys-
teriously) to appear at various levels of 
complexity, science would carry on. We 
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would do our best to understand such 
forces by measuring and characterizing 
them in any way that we could.  
What one doesn’t want is to have new 
forces of nature popping up indiscrimi-
nately. Strong emergence would not be 
so terrible as long as it didn’t happen too 
often—after all, the existing primitive 
forces just seemed to pop up out of no-
where and we have taken them in 
stride—or if it did happen often, if we 
could find a theory that let us predict 
when they would appear.  
What would be especially upsetting 
would be a new force of nature that vio-
lated the conservation laws. Suppose one 
could put certain components together 
and produce energy that didn’t depend 
on the energy or mass of the compo-
nents—the mass and energy of the com-
ponents remained intact, but the combi-
nation of those components created new 
energy. That would be scientifically 
quite disturbing—although it would cer-
tainly help with the energy problem.  
Since the appearance of new forces of 
nature that do not upset the conservation 
laws could be taken simply as an accept-
able extension of physics (but one that 
we have not seen and do not know how 
to produce), and since the appearance of 
new forces that violate the conservation 
laws is currently unimaginable, from 
now on we ignore the possibility of 
strong emergence. 
If one dismisses the possibility of strong 
emergence and agrees that the only 
forces of nature are the fundamental 
forces as determined by physics, then 
Fodor must also agree (no doubt he 
would) that any force-like construct pos-
tulated by any of the special sciences 
must be strictly reducible to the funda-
mental forces of physics. As Weinberg 
says, there is no life force. 
Note that this is a truly stark choice: 
strict reductionism with respect to forces 
or strong emergence. There is no third 
way. 
This leads to an important conclusion. 
Any cause-like effect that results from a 
force-like phenomenon in the domain of 
any of the special (i.e., higher level) sci-
ences must be epiphenomenal.10 Since 
epiphenomenal forces supervene on fun-
damental forces, distinct epiphenomenal 
interactions must be manifestations of 
distinct fundamental force actions. In 
other words, anything that happens at the 
most fundamental level (if there is one) 
has no more than one manifestation at 
any higher level. 
It is important to note that this perspec-
tive establishes one of the basic claims 
of reductionism: forces at all levels must 
be explicable in terms of—i.e., they are 
epiphenomenal of and reducible to—the 
fundamental forces of physics.11 There 
are no magical mystery forces; there is 
no strong emergence. 
The fact that all special (i.e., higher 
level) science interactions are epiphe-
nomenal is not a problem for functional-
ism. Nor is it news to Fodor, who speaks 
freely of “the to-ings and fro-ings of bits 
and pieces at the extreme microlevel.” 
Rather, the functionalist claim is that the 
regularities (be they epiphenomenal or 
                                                 
10
  Kim [Kim ‘93] (denigratingly) used the term 
epiphenomenal causation to refer to interactions of 
this sort. We also consider such interactions to be 
epiphenomenal, but we don’t find them less wor-
thy as a result. 
11
  Compare this with the conclusion Hume reached 
[Hume] in his considerations of causality—that 
when one looks carefully at any allegedly direct 
causal connection, one will find intermediary 
links. Since Hume did not presume what we now 
consider to be a bottom level of fundamental 
physical forces, he dismissed the notion of causal-
ity entirely. 
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not) that appear at the level of any spe-
cial science are of significance on their 
own. The fact that the interactions to 
which one refers in describing those 
regularities are in fact implemented by 
lower level interactions does not dimin-
ish either the importance or the lawful-
ness of the higher level regularities—
even though as we have seen Fodor has 
no idea how those regularities come 
about.  
2.6 Historical accidents and the 
environment 
There is a second area of at least implicit 
agreement between Weinberg and Fo-
dor. Consider the following from 
Weinberg.  
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Note Weinberg’s reference to historical 
accidents—which we also saw earlier, in 
both his definition of grand reductionism 
and his discussion of the weather. 
Weinberg gives historical accidents as 
important a role in shaping the world as 
he gives to the principles of physics. But 
he gives them a significantly lesser bill-
ing—one might say below the title in-
stead of above.  
The importance of historical accidents is 
especially clear when thinking about 
evolution. We suggest that contrary to 
Weinberg’s claim, the human nervous 
system (and human anatomy in general) 
evolved to what they are not primarily 
because of the principles of macroscopic 
physics and chemistry but primarily be-
cause of the environment in which that 
evolution took place—and in which the 
nervous system and anatomy must func-
tion.  
Because of the crucial role the environ-
ment plays in evolution, one cannot start 
with the principles of physics and chem-
istry and, considering them in isolation, 
derive human anatomy. Certainly human 
anatomy must be consistent with the 
principles of physics and chemistry. But 
human anatomy cannot be derived ex-
clusively from the principles of physics 
and chemistry. One must also consider 
the environment in which that anatomy 
is intended to function.  
We don’t think we are putting words 
into Weinberg’s mouth when we take his 
references to “historical accidents” to 
mean the environment and the context in 
which something occurs. If one grants us 
this, then as Weinberg acknowledges, 
the environment is often as significant a 
consideration in how things turn out as 
are the principles of physics.  
The same perspective is nearly (but not 
quite) explicit in the extracts from Fo-
dor. Recall Fodor’s list of artifacts, in-
cluding a mouse trap, a can opener, etc. 
All those artifacts are defined function-
ally, i.e., in terms of the functions they 
perform—which necessarily means 
functions performed in the environment 
in which they exist.  
A can opener in an environment in 
which cans are of an entirely different 
size or shape from our cans would not be 
a can opener. The same is true for a 
mousetrap in an environment in which 
mice were either the size of fleas or the 
size of elephants.  
And of course, the very name of the 
school of thought, functionalism, under-
lines its concern with how things func-
tion. Functionality is by definition a rela-
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tionship between something and its envi-
ronment—even if we limit the notion of 
an environment to the “inputs” and “out-
puts” of the element under consideration. 
It is also important to note that when one 
speaks of an environment, one must un-
derstand the environment at the level at 
which the object under consideration in-
teracts with it—even though as we saw 
earlier those interactions are epiphe-
nomenal. A can opener opens cans, and 
a mouse trap traps mice. Neither deals 
with swarms of quarks and other funda-
mental particles. As Fodor says, “live 
mouse in, dead mouse out.”  
Although neither side of this debate fo-
cuses on this issue, they are both appar-
ently in agreement that the environment 
within which something exists is impor-
tant.  
Interaction with an environment will 
turn out to be quite significant. We ex-
plore it further when we discuss autono-
mous entities and stigmergy. 
3 Emergence in the Game of 
Life 
In this section we use the Game of Life12 
[Gardner] to illustrate emergence: the 
implementation of a new level of ab-
straction on top of an existing substrate. 
• The Game of Life is a totalistic13 
two-dimensional cellular automaton. 
                                                 
12
  The Game of Life is a popular example in discus-
sions of emergence. Bedau uses it as the primary 
example in  “Downward causation and the auton-
omy of weak emergence” [Bedau]. We return to 
Bedau later. Dennett refers to it in “Real Patterns” 
[Dennett] when discussing how his intentional 
stance perspective compares to the perspectives of 
other philosophers with respect to the reality of be-
liefs. (His position is that beliefs should be consid-
ered to be “mildly real,” which is intermediate 
within the spectrum of positions he examines.)  
13
  Totalistic means that the action taken by an agent 
depends on the number of its neighbors in certain 
The Game of Life grid is assumed to 
be unbounded in each direction, like 
the tape of a Turing Machine. 
• An agent occupies each grid cell. 
Agents are fixed and cannot move 
around on the grid. This is not un-
usual in agent-based modeling. 
• Each agent is in one of two states: 
“alive” or “dead” or more simply on 
or off. 
• The 8 surrounding agents are an 
agent’s neighbors. 
• At each time step an agent deter-
mines whether it will be alive or 
dead at the next time step according 
to the following rules.  
• A live agent with two or three 
live neighbors stays alive; other-
wise it dies. 
• A dead agent with exactly three 
live neighbors is (miraculously) 
(re)born and becomes alive. 
• All agents update themselves simul-
taneously based on the values of 
their neighbors at that time step. 
It is useful to think of the Game of Life 
in the following three ways. 
1. Treat the Game of Life is a serious 
agent-based model—of something, 
perhaps life and death phenomena. 
For our purposes it doesn’t matter 
that the Game of Life isn’t a realistic 
model—of anything. Many agent-
based models are at the same time 
quite simple and quite revealing. 
2. Treat the Game of Life as a trivial 
physical universe. Recall Shalizi: 
                                                                   
states and not on which neighbors are in which 
state. 
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The Game of Life rules will be those 
“rules of the game.” The rules that 
determine how cells turn on and off 
will be taken as the most primitive 
operations of the physics of the 
Game of Life universe.14 When 
thinking in terms of this perspective, 
rather than thinking of a grid cell as 
occupied by (immobile) agents, we 
think of the cells themselves as 
something like primitive particles. 
The reductionist agenda within such 
a Game of Life universe would be to 
reduce every higher level phenome-
non to the underlying Game of Life 
rules.  
3. Treat the Game of Life as a pro-
gramming platform. 
Although these three perspectives will 
yield three different approaches to the 
phenomena generated, the phenomena 
themselves will be identical. It will al-
ways be the same Game of Life rules 
which determine what happens. 
3.1 Epiphenomenal gliders 
Figure 2 shows a sequence of 5 time 
steps in a Game of Life run. The dark 
cells (agents) are “alive;” the light cells 
(agents) are “dead.” One can apply the 
rules manually and satisfy oneself that 
they produce the sequence as shown. 
Notice that the fifth configuration shows 
the same pattern of live and dead cells as 
the first except that the pattern is offset 
                                                 
14
  This is the basis of what is sometimes called “digi-
tal physics” (see [Zuse], [Fredkin], and [Wolf-
ram]), which attempts to understand nature in 
terms of cellular automata.  
by one cell to the right and one cell 
down. 
If there are no other live cells on the 
grid, this process could be repeated in-
definitely, producing a glider-like effect.  
Such a glider is an epiphenomenon of 
the Game of Life rules. If one thinks 
about it—and forgets that one already 
knows that the Game of Life can pro-
duce gliders—gliders are quite amazing. 
A pattern that traverses the grid arises 
from very simple (and local) rules for 
turning cells on and off. 
We should be clear that gliders are 
epiphenomenal. The rules of the Game 
of Life do nothing but turn individual 
cells on and off. There is nothing in the 
rules about waves of cells turning on and 
off sweeping across the grid. Such 
epiphenomenal gliders exemplify emer-
gence.  
• Gliders are not generated explicitly: 
there is no glider algorithm. There is 
no “code” that explicitly decides 
which cells should be turned on and 
off to produce a glider. 
• Gliders are not visible in the rules. 
None of the rules are formulated, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, in terms 
of gliders. 
When looked at from our agent-based 
modeling perspective, gliders may repre-
sent epidemics or waves of births and 
deaths. If one were attempting to dem-
onstrate that such waves could be gener-
ated by simple agent-agent interactions, 
one might be quite pleased by this result. 
It might merit a conference paper. 
3.2 Gliders in our physics world 
From our physics perspective, we note 
that the rules are the only forces in our 
Game of Life universe. Being epiphe-
nomenal, gliders are causally power-
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less.15 The existence of a glider does not 
change either how the rules operate or 
which cells will be switched on and off. 
Gliders may be emergent, but they do 
not represent a new force of nature in the 
Game of Life universe. It may appear to 
us as observers that a glider looks like it 
is moving across the grid and that when 
it reaches a certain cell it will turn that 
cell on.  
But that’s not true. It is only the rules 
that turn cells on and off. A glider 
doesn’t “go to an cell and turn it on.” A 
Game of Life run will proceed in exactly 
the same way whether one notices the 
gliders or not. This is a very reductionist 
position. Things happen only as a result 
of the lowest level forces of nature, 
which in this case are the rules.  
3.3 The Game of Life as a pro-
gramming platform 
Amazing as they are, gliders are also 
trivial. Once one knows how to produce 
a glider, it’s a simple matter to make as 
many as one wants. If we look at the 
Game of Life as a programming plat-
form—imagine that we are kids fooling 
around with a new toy—we might ex-
periment with it to see whether we can 
make other sorts of patterns. If we find 
some, which we will, we might want to 
see what happens when patterns crash 
into each other—boys will be boys.  
After some time and effort, we might 
compile a library of Game of Life pat-
terns, including the API16 of each pattern, 
                                                 
15
  All epiphenomena are causally powerless. Since 
epiphenomena are simply another way of perceiv-
ing underlying phenomena, an epiphenomenon it-
self cannot have an effect on anything. It is the un-
derlying phenomena that act. 
16
  Application Programming Interface 
which describes what happens when that 
pattern collides with other patterns.17  
Since its introduction three decades ago, 
a community of such Game of Life pro-
grammers has developed. That commu-
nity has created such libraries—at least 
on an informal basis.18  
It has even been shown [Rendell] that by 
suitably arranging Game of Life pat-
terns, one can simulate a Turing Ma-
chine.  
Moreover, and this is a crucial point, the 
emulation of a Turing Machine with 
Game of Life patterns is also an example 
of emergence. There is no algorithm. 
The Turing Machine appears as a conse-
quence of epiphenomenal interactions 
among epiphenomenal patterns! 
What did we just say? What does it 
mean to say that epiphenomenal gliders 
and other epiphenomenal patterns simu-
late a Turing Machine? How can it mean 
anything? The patterns aren’t real; the 
Turing Machine isn’t real; they are all 
(nothing but) epiphenomena.  
Furthermore, even the interactions be-
tween and among patterns aren’t real ei-
ther. They’re also epiphenomenal—and 
epiphenomenal in the sense described 
above: the only real action is at the most 
fundamental level, the Game of Life 
rules. Pattern APIs notwithstanding the 
only thing that happens on a Game of 
Life grid is that the Game of Life rules 
determine which cells are to be on and 
                                                 
17
  Note, however, that interactions among patterns 
are quite fragile. If two patterns meet in slightly 
different ways, the results will generally be quite 
different. 
18
  Many of these libraries are available on the web. 
To explore this world, a good place to start and 
one that seems to be kept up to date is Jason’s Life 
Page [Summers]. The patterns available on that 
page and on the pages to which that page links are 
quite amazing. 
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which cells are to be off. No matter how 
real the patterns look to us, interaction 
among them is always epiphenomenal. 
So what are we talking about? 
What does one do to show that a Game 
of Life emulation of a Turing machine is 
correct? What one must do is to adopt a 
operational perspective and treat the pat-
terns and their interactions, i.e., the de-
sign itself, independently of the Game of 
Life. 
It is the design, i.e., the way in which the 
patterns—be they real or epiphenome-
nal—interact that we want to claim sim-
ulates a Turing Machine. To show that 
we must do two things.  
1. Show that the abstract design con-
sisting of patterns and their interac-
tions actually does simulate a Turing 
Machine. That is, we reify the de-
sign, i.e., treat it as real, and argue 
about its properties. 
2. Show that the design can be imple-
mented on a Game-of-Life platform. 
Note what this perspective does. It un-
shackles the design from its moorings as 
a Game of Life epiphenomenon, reifies 
it as an independent abstraction, and lets 
it float free. (The protestors in the streets 
chanting “Free the design” can now 
lower their picket signs and go home.)  
The design becomes an abstraction, an 
abstract construct on its own. Once we 
have such a design as an abstraction we 
can then reason about its properties, i.e., 
(a) that it accomplishes what we want, 
namely that it simulates a Turing Ma-
chine and (b) that it can be reattached to 
its moorings and be implemented on a 
Game of Life platform. In other words, 
emergence is getting epiphenomena to 
do real (functional) work.  
3.4 Game of Life anthropologists 
Let’s forget everything we just said 
about the Game of Life, and let’s pretend 
we are anthropologists. Let’s imagine 
that a lost tribe of what turn out to be 
Game of Life creatures has been discov-
ered in a remote wilderness. Of course, 
when they are first discovered, we don’t 
know that they are Game of Life crea-
tures. All we know is that their strange 
grid-like faces are made up of cells that 
blink on and off. 
We get a grant to study these creatures. 
We travel to their far-off village, and we 
learn their language. They can’t seem to 
explain what makes their cells blink on 
and off; we have to figure that out for 
ourselves. 
After months of study, we come up with 
the Game of Life rules as an explanation 
for how the grid cells are controlled. 
That seems to work. Every single mem-
ber of the tribe operates in a way that is 
consistent with those rules. The rules 
even explain the unusual patterns that we 
observe—some of them, glider-like, 
traversing the entire grid. Thrilled with 
our analysis, we return home and publish 
our results. 
But one thing continues to nag. One of 
the teenage girls—she calls herself 
Hacka for reasons that we do not under-
stand—has a pattern of activities on her 
grid that seems more complex than most 
of the others. The Game of Life rules 
fully explain every light that goes on and 
every light that goes off on Hacka’s 
pretty face. But somehow that explana-
tion doesn’t seem to capture everything 
that’s going on. It just seems more com-
plex than that. Did we miss something? 
To make a long story short, it turns out 
that the tribe was not as isolated as we 
had thought. In fact they have an Internet 
connection. Hacka had learned not only 
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that she was a Game of Life system but 
that the Game of Life can emulate a Tur-
ing Machine. She had decided to pro-
gram herself to do just that. Her parents 
disapproved. But girls just want to have 
fun—especially teenage girls. 
No wonder we felt uncertain about our 
results. Even though the Game of Life 
rules explained every light that went on 
and off on Hacka’s face, it said nothing 
about the functionality implemented by 
Hacka’s Turing Machine emulation.  
The rules explained everything about 
how the system worked; but they said 
nothing about what the system did. The 
rules didn’t have a way even to begin to 
talk about the functionality of the sys-
tem—which was logically independent 
of the rules. The rules simply don’t talk 
about Turing Machines.  
A Turing machine is an autonomous 
functional abstraction that we (and 
Hacka) built on top of the rules of the 
Game of Life. Our reductive explana-
tion, that a certain set of rules make the 
cells go on and off, had no way to cap-
ture this sort of additional functionality.19 
3.5 Keeping score 
In the debate between reductionism and 
functionalism, the fact that one can build 
a Game of Life Turing Machine may be 
scored as follows.  
                                                 
19
  In “Real Patterns” Dennett [Dennett ‘91] uses the 
fact that a Turing Machine may be implemented in 
terms of Game of Life patterns to argue that the 
position he takes in The Intentional Stance [Den-
nett ‘87] falls midway along a spectrum of posi-
tions ranging from what he calls “Industrial 
strength Realism” to eliminative materialism (that 
beliefs are nothing but convenient fictions).  
Our focus in this paper differs from Dennett’s in 
that it is not on psychological states or mental 
events but on the nature of regularities—
independently of whether those regularities are the 
subject matter of anyone’s beliefs. 
• Reductionism scores a point—with 
which it was credited earlier—in that 
the only forces operating are (and 
must be) reducible to the fundamen-
tal operational rules of the Game of 
Life.  
In philosophical terms, this would be 
considered an supervenience physi-
calism: any apparent higher level 
forces or interactions are nothing 
more than conceptually convenient 
ways of packaging lower level forces 
and interactions. 
• Functionalism scores a point in that 
the functionality of a Turing Ma-
chine is beyond the realm of and can 
neither be reduced to nor derived 
from the Game of Life rules.  
Functionalism gets only partial credit 
because it is quite clear (if im-
mensely complicated)—but not at all 
mysterious and not on a par with the 
question of why anything exists at 
all—how a Turing Machine may be 
implemented in  terms of Game of 
Life rules. All that is required is that 
a design for a Turing Machine emu-
lator be implemented by using the 
Game of Life as a software devel-
opment platform. 
3.6 Defining emergence 
With this background, we can define 
emergence as a relationship between a 
phenomenon and a model.  
By a model we will mean a collection of 
elements with certain interrelationships, 
e.g., the grid cells and rules of the Game 
of Life. 
To begin, given some model we will say 
that a phenomenon is emergent over that 
model if it is epiphenomenal with re-
spect to that model. In other words, all 
epiphenomena are emergent, and all 
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emergent phenomena are epiphenome-
nal. In short, we define epiphenomenal 
and emergent to be synonyms.  
Recall that we defined an epiphenome-
non to be a phenomenon that is appre-
hended, conceptualized, or perceived in-
dependently of the forces that bring it 
about. Thus a phenomenon is emergent 
if it is conceptualized independently of 
the phenomena that implement it. As we 
pointed out in our discussion of epiphe-
nomena earlier, this is familiar territory 
for Engineering and Computer Science. 
Requirements and specifications are by 
intention written in terms that do not de-
pend on the design or implementation of 
the systems that realize them.  
More concretely we define a phenome-
non as emergent over a model if it satis-
fies two conditions. 
1. The phenomenon as a phenomenon 
may be understood on its own. Its 
conceptualization does not depend 
on the model from which it emer-
ges.20 
2. There is an implementation of the 
phenomenon in terms of elements of 
the model.21  
Our prototypical examples are gliders 
and Turing Machines, which we will say 
are emergent over the Game of Life. 
                                                 
20
  We are not requiring that there be a person to do 
the conceptualizing, only that such an independent 
conceptualization be possible. 
21
  Our concern with implementations distinguishes 
our position from both functionalism and Den-
nett’s intentional stance, neither of which cares 
much about how higher level phenomena are im-
plemented.  
It may be that emergent phenomena may have 
multiple realizations—Turing Machines may be 
epiphenomena of many computing substrates—but 
this will not be the most commonly occurring 
situation in nature. Non-computational epiphe-
nomena will usually occur as the consequence of a 
particular implementation.   
Notice that we do not require an emer-
gent phenomenon to have a formal de-
scription or specification. Certainly 
some epiphenomena may be formalized 
and understood as formalized abstrac-
tions—the Turning Machine for exam-
ple. Epiphenomena about which such in-
dependent formal theories may be de-
veloped often tend to be particularly use-
ful cases of emergence from a scientific 
or mathematical perspective.  
On the other hand, we shall see later that 
there are epiphenomena about which it is 
either not feasible or not useful to define 
abstract theories but which are important 
to us nevertheless. As an immediate and 
familiar (if informal) example, consider 
the so-called edge-of-chaos behavior of 
certain cellular automata. (See, for ex-
ample, [Langton].) Edge-of-chaos auto-
mata are those whose runs become nei-
ther trivially predictable nor apparently 
chaotic. We tend to find this sort of 
(emergent) behavior interesting but dif-
ficult to formalize. We are not aware of 
any formal characterization of properties 
that distinguish edge-of-chaos phenom-
ena from others. 
To be clear, our definition of emergence 
allows us to label as emergent anything 
that is computable from a model state or 
sequence of states. Thus any conceptual 
construct that one can impose on a 
model counts as an emergent phenome-
non.  
This may seem overly simple or overly 
broad, and it certainly seems anti-
climactic. But this definition does seem 
to include everything we think of as 
emergent. Whether it also includes phe-
nomena that we would not want to con-
sider emergent is open to debate.22 
                                                 
22
  Let’s contrast our definition of emergence with 
Bedau’s. For Bedau, a property or phenomenon is 
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More to the point, though, we are pro-
posing that the essence of emergence is 
the independent conceptualization of the 
emergent phenomenon.  
• Any phenomenon that may be under-
stood in its own terms and whose 
understanding does not depend on 
knowing how it is implemented is 
emergent under our definition.  
• No phenomenon that cannot be so 
understood will be emergent for us.  
Emergent phenomena are often associ-
ated with a sense of surprise: where did 
that come from? how did that happen? 
Clearly the surprise of an observer has 
little to do with how one should under-
stand nature. Surprise is not uncommon, 
however, because phenomena are typi-
cally thought of as emergent when we 
perceive them before we understand how 
they are brought about.  Sometimes it 
may appear that there is no way for a 
                                                                   
emergent [Bedau] if it is applicable at some macro 
level but not at any micro sublevel. If one identi-
fies macro with epiphenomenal and micro with 
underlying, our definition and Bedau’s are quite 
similar except that Bedau explicitly excludes what 
he calls trivially emergent properties. A property is 
trivially emergent for Bedau if (to use our terms) it 
is essentially the same property at the epiphe-
nomenal and underlying levels. As an example, 
Bedau’s definition excludes the mass of an aggre-
gate from being an emergent property of the ag-
gregate because mass is also a property of the 
components. Our definition does not make that ex-
clusion. For us the mass and (perhaps more inter-
estingly) the center of gravity of an aggregate both 
qualify as emergent.  
Our definition is similar to but less restrictive than 
Shalizi’s [Shalizi 2001] and [Shalizi 2005], which 
requires that an emergent phenomenon be compu-
tationally simpler than the phenomena from which 
it emerges. If an epiphenomenon has its own for-
malizable abstraction, it will often (but even then 
not always) be the case that  computations per-
formed in terms of that abstraction will be simpler 
than the equivalent computations performed in 
terms of the underlying model. But we don’t re-
quire this. In addition, many epiphenomena do not 
have easily formalizable abstractions. 
surprising result to be brought about. Of 
course there always is, but this reaction 
is reminiscent of the remark by Arthur 
C. Clarke that  
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4 Implications of emergence 
The technique of implementing an ab-
stract design by using lower level con-
structs is not new; it is the bread and but-
ter of Computer Science. In a recent re-
view [CFCS] of the status of Computer 
Science, the Committee on the Funda-
mentals of Computer Science: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities, National Re-
search Council wrote (p. 65) the follow-
ing.  
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This section explores the implications of 
emergence that our Turing Machine ex-
ample illustrates.  
                                                 
23
  Although the bracketed texts says a bit more than 
was literally in the original, we believe it expresses 
the authors’ intentions. 
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4.1 Non-reductive regularities 
Recall Weinberg’s statement. 
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Clearly there are lots of autonomous 
“laws” of Turing Machines (namely 
computability theory), and they are all 
logically independent of the rules of the 
Game of Life. 
The fact that one can emulate a Turing 
Machine on a Game of Life platform 
tells us nothing about Turing Ma-
chines—other than that they can be emu-
lated by using the Game of Life.  
An emulation of a Turing Machine on 
the Game of Life is an example of what 
might be called a non-reductive regular-
ity. The Turing Machine and its emula-
tion is certainly a kind of regularity, but 
the regularity that it embodies (i.e., that 
it is a model for computability) is not a 
logical consequence of (i.e., is not re-
ducible to and cannot be deduced from) 
the Game of Life rules.  
Facts about Turing Machines, i.e., the 
theorems of computability theory, are 
derived de novo. They are made up out 
of whole cloth; they are not based on the 
Game of Life rules. The fact that such 
abstract designs can be realized using 
Game of Life rules as an implementation 
platform tells us nothing about comput-
ability theory that we don’t already 
know.  
4.2 Downward entailment 
On the other hand, the fact that a Turing 
Machine can be implemented using the 
Game of Life rules as primitives does 
tell us something about the Game of 
Life—namely that the results of comput-
ability theory can be applied to the 
Game of Life. The property of being 
Turing complete applies to the Game of 
Life precisely because a Turing Machine 
can be shown to be one of its possible 
epiphenomena.  
In other words, epiphenomena are 
downward entailing. Properties of 
epiphenomena are also properties of the 
phenomena from which they spring. This 
is not quite as striking as downward cau-
sation24 would be, but it is a powerful in-
tellectual tool. 
Earlier, we dismissed the notion that a 
glider may be said to “go to a cell and 
turns it on.” The only things that turn on 
Game of Life grid cells are the Game of 
Life rules. But because of downward en-
tailment, there is hope for talk of this 
sort. 
To prove that a Turing Machine emula-
tion on a Game of Life platform does 
what we claim it does we disengaged the 
design of the emulation from its imple-
mentation, and we reasoned about the 
emulation as an abstract design. We can 
do the same thing with gliders. We can 
establish a domain of discourse about 
gliders as abstract entities. Within that 
domain of discourse we can reason about 
gliders, and in particular we can reason 
about which cells a glider will turn on 
and when it will turn them on. Our the-
ory will tell us how fast an in which di-
rection a glider moves  
Having developed facts and rules about 
gliders as independent abstract elements, 
we can then use the fact that gliders are 
epiphenomena of the Game of Life and 
by appeal to downward entailment apply 
those facts and rules to the Game of Life 
cells that implement gliders.  
                                                 
24
  See, for example [Emmeche] for a number of so-
phisticated discussions of downward causation. 
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This sounds more complex than it really 
is. What it really amounts to is that 
downward entailment justifies what we 
as human beings tend to do anyway: no-
tice regularities in the world and then 
engage the world in terms of those regu-
larities.  
4.3 Reduction proofs 
Consider how the unsolvability of the 
halting problem applies to the Game of 
Life. The fact that a Turing Machine can 
be implemented on a Game of Life plat-
form means, among other things that the 
halting problem for the Game of Life—
which we can define as determining 
whether a game of Life run ever reaches 
a stable (unchanging or repeating) con-
figuration—is unsolvable.  
When reasoning about insolvability one 
often talks of reducing one problem to 
another. In this case, because we can 
implement Turing Machines using the 
Game of Life, we know that we can re-
duce the halting problem for Turing Ma-
chines to the halting problem for the 
Game of Life: if we could solve the 
Game of Life halting problem, we could 
solve the Turing Machine halting prob-
lem. But we know that the Turing Ma-
chine halting problem is unsolvable. 
Therefore the Game of Life halting prob-
lem is also unsolvable. This sort of 
downward entailment reduction gives us 
a lot of intellectual leverage since it’s 
not at all clear how difficult it would be 
to prove “directly” that the halting prob-
lem for the Game of Life is unsolvable. 
Thus another consequence of downward 
entailment is that reducibility cuts both 
ways. One can conclude that if some-
thing is impossible at a higher level it 
must be impossible at the lower (imple-
mentation) level as well. But the only 
way to reach that conclusion is to reason 
about the higher level as an independent 
abstraction and then to reconnect that 
abstraction to the lower level. Logically 
independent higher level abstractions, 
i.e., functionality and design, matter on 
their own. 
4.4 Downward entailment as sci-
ence 
A striking example of downward entail-
ment is the kind of computation we do 
when computing the effect of one bil-
liard ball on another in a Newtonian uni-
verse. It’s a simple calculation involving 
vectors and the transfer of kinetic en-
ergy.  
In truth there is no fundamental force of 
physics corresponding to kinetic energy. 
If one had to compute the consequences 
of a billiard ball collision in terms of 
quantum states and the electromagnetic 
force, which is the one that applies, the 
task would be impossibly complex. But 
the computation is easy to do at the 
epiphenomenal level of billiard balls. 
We know that the computation we do at 
the billiard ball level applies to the real 
world because of downward entailment: 
billiard balls are epiphenomena of the 
underlying reality. So even though it 
may be literally incorrect to say that a 
glider “turns on a Game of Life cell” or 
that “one billiard ball pushes another one 
in a particular direction,” because of 
downward entailment this sort of con-
ceptual shorthand is not only reasonable 
but essential for how we think about the 
world. But see the discussion of Newto-
nian mechanics in the next section for a 
somewhat stronger version of this per-
spective. 
Downward entailment in the form of the 
process just sketched is, in fact, a rea-
sonable description of how we do sci-
ence: we build models, which we then 
apply to the world around us. 
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We are not saying that there are forces in 
the world that operate according to bil-
liard ball rules or that there are forces in 
the Game of Life that operate according 
to glider rules. That would be downward 
causation, a form of strong emergence, 
which we have already ruled out. What 
we are saying is that billiard balls, glid-
ers, Turing Machines, and their interac-
tions can be defined in the abstract. We 
can reason about them as abstractions, 
and then through downward entailment 
we can apply the results of that reason-
ing to any implementation of those ab-
stractions whenever the implementation 
preserves the assumptions required by 
the abstraction. 
4.5 The reality of higher level ab-
stractions 
In “Real Patterns” [Dennett ‘91], Den-
nett argues that when compared with the 
work required to compute the equivalent 
results in terms of primitive forces, one 
gets a “stupendous” “scale of compres-
sion” when one adopts his notion of an 
intentional stance [Dennett ‘87]. Al-
though “Real Patterns” doesn’t spell out 
the link explicitly, Dennett’s position 
appears to be that because of that intel-
lectual advantage, one should treat the 
ontologies offered by the intentional 
stance as what he calls “mildly real”—
although he doesn’t spell out in any de-
tail what regarding something as  
“mildly real” involves. 
Our position contrasts with Dennett’s in 
that we claim that nature is often best 
understood—the theories of science are 
best expressed—in terms of two-level 
(or perhaps multi-level) theories. One 
level is an abstract design; the other 
level is the implementation of that de-
sign. Whether or not one wants to say 
that the abstract design is “mildly real” 
(or real with some other adjective ap-
plied) is not our focus.25  
As we shall see below, our claim will 
also be that the entities (such as billiard 
balls) about which higher level abstrac-
tions are formulated are real in an objec-
tive sense (they have reduced entropy) 
but that interactions among those entities 
are epiphenomenal—since the only 
forces in nature are the fundamental 
forces. 
In a recent book [Laughlin], Laughlin 
argues for what he calls collective prin-
ciples of organization, which he finds to 
be at least as important as reductionist 
principles. For example in discussing 
Newton’s laws he concludes from the 
fact that (p. 31) 
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  Furthermore, our position is that the question of 
whether or not anyone would find it advantageous 
to have beliefs about epiphenomena (which is 
Dennett’s primary concern) has nothing to do with 
the issues we are considering. 
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A second example to which Laughlin 
frequently returns is the solid state of 
matter, which, as he points out, exhibits 
properties of rigidity and elasticity. The 
solid state of matter may be character-
ized as material that may be understood 
as a three dimensional lattice of compo-
nents held together by forces acting 
among those components.  
Once one has defined an abstract struc-
ture of this sort, one can derive proper-
ties of matter having this structure. One 
can do so without knowing anything 
more about either (a) the particular ele-
ments at the lattice nodes or (b) how the 
binding forces are implemented. All one 
needs to know are the strengths of the 
forces and the shape of the lattice.  
From our perspective, both Newton’s 
laws and the solid state of matter are ab-
stract organizational designs, i.e., epi-
phenomena. They are abstractions that 
apply to nature in much the same way as 
a Turing Machine as an abstraction ap-
plies to certain cell configurations in the 
Game of Life. Laughlin calls the imple-
mentation of such an abstraction a pro-
tectorate. 
Laughlin points out that protectorates 
tend to have feasibility ranges, which are 
often characterized by size, speed, and 
temperature. A few molecules of H2O 
won’t have the usual properties of ice. 
And ice, like most solids, melts when 
heated to a point at which the attractive 
forces are no longer able to preserve the 
lattice configuration of the elements. 
Similarly Newton’s laws fail at the quan-
tum level.  
The existence of such feasibility ranges 
does not reduce the importance of either 
the solid matter abstraction or the New-
tonian physics abstraction. They just 
limit the conditions under which those 
abstractions apply, i.e., under which na-
ture is able to implement them. 
The more general point is that nature 
implements a great many such abstract 
designs. As is the case with computabil-
ity theory, which includes many sophis-
ticated results about the Turing machine 
abstraction, there are often sophisticated 
theories that characterize the properties 
of such naturally occurring abstractions. 
These theories may have nothing to do 
with how the abstract designs are im-
plemented. They are functional theories 
that apply to the abstract designs them-
selves. To apply such theories to a real 
physical example (through downward 
entailment), all one needs is for the 
physical example to implement the ab-
stract designs. 
Furthermore and perhaps more impor-
tantly, these abstract designs are neither 
derivable from nor logical consequences 
of their implementations. Abstract de-
signs and the theories built on them are 
new and creative constructs and are not 
consequences of the platform on which 
they are implemented. The Game of Life 
doesn’t include the concept of a Turing 
machine, and quantum physics doesn’t 
include the concept of a solid.  
The point of all this is to support Laugh-
lin position: when nature implements an 
abstraction, the epiphenomena described 
by that abstraction become just as real 
any other phenomena, and the abstrac-
tion that describes them is just as valid a 
description of that aspect of nature as 
any other description of any other aspect 
of nature.  
Our notion that much of nature is best 
understood in terms of implementations 
of abstractions suggests that many scien-
tific theories are best expressed at two 
levels: (1) the level of an abstraction it-
self, i.e., how it is specified, how it 
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works on the abstract level, and what its 
implications are, and (2) the level that 
explains (a) under what circumstances 
(when and where) that abstraction may 
be found implemented and (b) how that 
implementation works.  
The use of agent-based modeling in the 
social sciences illustrates this methodol-
ogy. Agent-based models are typically 
used to show both (a) how a higher level 
abstraction functions in its context, i.e., 
what its consequences as a theory are, 
and (b) how that abstraction may come 
to be realized in terms of some particular 
set of lower level interactions. 
4.6 Abstractions and abstract 
designs 
We have intentionally used the terms ab-
straction and abstract design somewhat 
interchangeably. Abstraction is, of 
course, a much more general term. Yet 
from the perspective of scientific expla-
nation, what one is looking for is, as 
Weinberg says, a description of  why na-
ture is the way it is.  
To some extent, this includes the ques-
tion of why nature is made up of what-
ever makes it up. But for the most part,  
this question is generally taken to be 
asking why nature works the way it 
does.   
As summarized by Woodward [Wood-
ward], scientific explanations are in-
tended to explain 
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Typically we are looking for an opera-
tional explanation: how does nature 
work?26 Thus when we speak of an ab-
stract design, we are referring to the de-
sign of an operational mechanism that 
can be understood as bringing about 
some consequence. From here on, when 
we talk about abstractions or abstract 
designs, this is what we have in mind: 
the abstract design of a mechanism that 
produces certain kinds of results.  
Note that it is not just the functional re-
sults that matter; the abstract operational 
design matters also. A Turing Machine 
is not just a device whose input-output 
functionality satisfies the theorems of 
computability theory; it is an abstract 
device that operates in a particular way. 
The theorems of computability theory 
follow from the way a Turing Machine 
operates, not the other way around. It is 
the abstract operational design that 
comes first. The theory follows. 
This operational perspective seems to be 
somewhat different from that of tradi-
tional functionalism. Functionalism is 
concerned with the functions and regu-
larities that characterize the special sci-
ences. It tends not to be concerned with 
how those functions or regularities are 
realized. In fact the opposite seems to be 
the case. By emphasizing the possibility 
of multiple realizability, functionalism 
minimizes the importance of any par-
ticular realization and dismisses the im-
portance of understanding operational 
design issues. 
4.7 Phase transitions 
Those of us in Computer Science know 
that implementations of abstract designs 
are often not perfect. Most include some 
compromises, and some have bugs. 
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  As Woodward explains, though, the question of 
what should be taken as a scientific explanation is 
the subject of continuing investigation. 
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What about nature’s implementation of 
abstract designs?  
Nature’s implementation of abstract de-
signs are not always perfect either—
especially, as Laughlin points out, either 
(a) when the conditions under which an 
implementation is feasible are not in ef-
fect or (b) when one approaches the 
boundaries of such feasibility regions.  
There will almost always be borderline 
situations in which the implementation 
of an abstract design is on the verge of 
breaking down. These borderline situa-
tions frequently manifest as what we call 
phase transitions—regions or points (re-
lated to a parameter such as size, speed, 
temperature, and pressure) where multi-
ple distinct and incompatible abstrac-
tions may to be implemented. 
Newton’s laws fail at both the quantum 
level and at relativistic speeds. If as 
Laughlin suggests, the Newtonian ab-
straction cannot be shown to be an ap-
proximation of quantum theory, phase 
transitions should appear as one ap-
proaches the quantum realm.  
As explained by Sachdev [Sachdev], the 
transition from a Newtonian gas to a 
Boise-Einstein condensate (such as su-
per-fluid liquid helium) illustrates such a 
phase transition. 
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On the other hand, since Newton’s laws 
are indeed an approximation of relativis-
tic physics, there are no Newtonian-
related phase transitions as one ap-
proaches relativistic speeds. 
These considerations suggest that when-
ever data that suggests a phase transition 
appears, one should look for two or more 
abstractions with implementations hav-
ing overlapping or adjacent feasibility 
regions. 
Speculatively, one might even view 
quantum probability amplitude waves as 
phase transition phenomena. Quantum 
states are discrete. Matter may not oc-
cupy states that are intermediate between 
them. Consequently, matter cannot tran-
sition smoothly from one quantum state 
to another. As Hardy suggests [Hardy], 
by making such transitions probabilisti-
cally continuous,  
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Quantum waves exhibit interference pat-
terns. It might be worthwhile to attempt 
to characterize non-quantum phase tran-
sitions as wave phenomena and to look 
for interference patterns there. 
4.8 The constructionist hypothe-
sis revisited 
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Earlier we noted Anderson’s rejection of 
what he called the constructionist hy-
pothesis,  
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Our considerations in this section clarify 
this rejection.  
The constructionist agenda is simply not 
within the realm of science. Even were it 
theoretically possible, it simply is not 
one of the tasks that science sets for it-
self to reconstruct the universe from the 
principles of physics and some initial 
state of the universe.27 Science simply 
does not attempt to imagine all the pos-
sible configurations of matter and energy 
that are consistent with the constraints 
imposed by the fundamental laws of 
physics, i.e., all the possible abstract de-
signs that nature may possibly imple-
ment, and predict which will come to 
pass.  
It is worth considering what the role of 
experiments would be were it possible to 
start with the fundamental laws of phys-
ics and reconstruct the universe. We can 
think of two. 
1. To help refine our understanding of 
the fundamental laws of physics. 
2. If the laws of physics require that 
one of a number of possible situa-
tions be the case, to decide which of 
them actually is the case. 
Most experiments are done for neither of 
these reasons. Most experiments are 
done to help establish whether some 
higher level regularity actually holds.  
Recently in the news were the results of 
the impact of a projectile with the comet 
Tempel 1. As reported by Cowan 
[Cowan], the experiment 
                                                 
27
  Although see our comments about theories of the 
origin of the universe and biological evolution in 
the final section. 
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These are not the words of scientists in 
the process of deriving results about 
comets from the fundamental laws of 
physics. These are scientists building 
higher level models. 
It is just as wrong for Weinberg to deni-
grate the notion that there can be inde-
pendent principles of chemistry or psy-
chology as it would be for him to claim 
that the principles of Mathematics and 
Computer Science are all reducible to 
and derivable from physics.  
Most sciences are like Mathematics and 
Computer Science. They really do stand 
on their own—which is why (as Ander-
son says) the constructionist hypothesis 
is wrong and why (as Fodor says) the 
special sciences are autonomous.. 
5 Entities 
So far, we have discussed what one 
might characterize as emergence in the 
large. There is also emergence on a 
smaller and more local scale. That sort 
of emergence is related to what we intui-
tively think of as entities.  This section 
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discusses entities and how they relate to 
emergence. 
We think in terms of entities, i.e., things 
or objects. It seems like the most natural 
thing in the world. Yet the question of 
how one might characterize what should 
and should not be considered an entity 
has long been a subject of philosophical 
study. A brief review of the recent litera-
ture (for example, [Boyd], [Laylock], 
[Miller], [Rosen], [Varzi Fall ‘04]) sug-
gests that no consensus about how to 
understand the notion of “an entity” has 
yet been reached.  
One might adopt a very general position. 
For example, Laylock quotes Lowe 
[Lowe] as follows. 
#) 
$-     - 

 ' 
 #$ #$% 
      ' 
 *
, ' % % -
' 

 
     -  & -
-   + 
 - 
  %       -
- & -  - - % 
  2
, ' % % 
*2 % #
$
For our purposes, this is too broad. In 
this paper we want to exclude properties, 
relations, events, numbers, sets and 
propositions from our notion of entity. 
We don’t want to think of, say, the 
American Civil War or happiness as an 
entity in the same way that we think of 
an atom is an entity.  
On the other hand, we don’t want to 
limit ourselves to strictly material ob-
jects. We want to include countries, 
teams, corporations, and families, for  
example, as well as what may seem like 
quasi-physical entities such as people 
and hurricanes, whose physical makeup 
undergoes continual change.  
For our purposes, entities, by fiat, will 
always have some material aspect. That 
is, an entity will at any time consist of 
physical elements arranged in a particu-
lar way. With this decision we are ex-
cluding from our notion of entity strictly 
mental constructs such as sets, numbers, 
concepts, propositions, relationships, de-
signs, abstractions, etc.  
If the preceding does not formally ex-
clude instants, events, and durations, we 
will explicitly exclude them too. Entities 
for us will be required to persist in time, 
but they will not be aspects of time, i.e., 
instants or durations, or events, whatever 
an event is. 
An entity for us will be either atomic 
(not in the sense of being a chemical 
element but in the more generic sense of  
having no constituents—if indeed there 
are atomic physical elements in nature), 
or, if an entity has constituents, it will be 
an epiphenomenon of its constituents. 
Thus for us non-atomic entities will rep-
resent one of the most common forms of 
emergence.  
Our purpose in this section is not to set-
tle the grand philosophical question of 
what one should mean by the terms 
thing, object or entity but to sketch out 
what it means to be an entity in our 
sense. Of course we hope that the 
framework we develop will offer a use-
ful way of thinking about some of the 
uses to which we commonly put the 
terms thing, object, and entity.  
5.1 Entities, entropy, designs, 
and functionality 
The standard model of physics includes 
fundamental particles such as electrons, 
photons, quarks, etc. These are entities 
which have no constituents. Beyond 
these, one has atomic nuclei, atoms, and 
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molecules, all of which we want to in-
clude in our notion of entity. 
For functionalism, entities are every-
where: mice and cans are good exam-
ples. The higher level sciences speak of 
all sorts of entities, including biological 
entities (e.g., you and me) and social, 
political, and economic entities, such as 
families, states, and corporations.  
We propose to characterize an entity as 
either atomic or as any demarcatable re-
gion that exhibits a persistent and self-
perpetuating reduced level of entropy. 
Since we are not prepared to define the 
term demarcatable region, perhaps de-
fining entity in terms of a notion as 
loosely defined as demarcatable region 
doesn’t get one very far.28 But the notion 
of an entity always seems to imply a 
boundary that distinguishes the entity 
from its surroundings. Entities in our 
sense always have an “inside.”  
We discuss two kinds of entities: entities 
at an energy equilibrium and entities that 
are far from equilibrium.29  
It is important to note that since non-
atomic entities have a reduced level of 
entropy, they always have an internal 
structure, i.e., a design. Furthermore, the 
design of an entity often allows it to as-
sume one or more states. A good exam-
ple is the design of an atom: a nucleus 
along with associated electrons in vari-
ous orbitals. Among the states of an 
atom are those differentiated by the dif-
fering energy levels of its electrons. 
It seems pretty clear that we (and other 
animals) have evolved the ability to per-
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  As Varzi [Varzi Spring ‘04] points out, the notion 
of a boundary is itself quite difficult to pin down. 
Some boundaries, Mt. Everest’s, for example, are 
quite vague. 
29
  We first proposed this in [Abbott]. 
ceive entities in this sense. Our intuitive 
sense of entity seems to map fairly well 
onto the notion of a persistent demarcat-
able region that displays some special 
order that distinguishes it from its envi-
ronment, i.e., an area that has an internal 
design. 
We use the term design deliberately. En-
tities implement abstract designs in 
much the same way as abstract designs 
such as Newtonian mechanics are im-
plemented on a larger scale. Because an 
entity implements a particular design, it 
exhibits the functionality that its design 
produces. One of the tasks of science, 
then, is to decide for any entity (or cate-
gory of entities), what design it embod-
ies and what the implications of that de-
sign are for the behavior of that entity 
(or those entities). 
When nature implements an abstract de-
sign such as solid matter or Newtonian 
mechanics it is the functionalities that 
come along with that design—what the 
design implies about how matter that 
implements it behaves—that make us in-
terested in it. These larger scale abstract 
designs are typically embodied by sub-
stances or by arbitrary collections of 
things. In contrast, the designs that enti-
ties implement produce a particular kind 
of functionality in a constrained and 
bounded region.  
5.2 Entities at an energy equilib-
rium 
The entities of physics and chemistry are 
at an energy equilibrium. A distinguish-
ing feature of these entities is that the 
mass of any one of them is strictly 
smaller than the sum of the masses of its 
components. This may be seen most 
clearly in nuclear fission and fusion, in 
which one starts and ends with the same 
number of atomic components, i.e., elec-
trons, protons, and neutrons—which 
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raises the obvious question: which mass 
was converted to energy?  
The answer has to do with the strong nu-
clear force, which implements what is 
called the “binding energy” of nucleons 
within a nucleus. Without going into de-
tails, the bottom line is that the mass of, 
say, a helium nucleus (also known as an 
alpha particle, two protons and two neu-
trons), which is one of the products of 
hydrogen fusion, is less than the sum of 
the masses of the protons and neutrons 
that make up an alpha particle when not 
bound together as an alpha particle.30 
The same entity-mass relationship holds 
for all physical and chemical entities. 
The mass of an atom or molecule is 
(negligibly) less than the sum of the 
masses of its components taken sepa-
rately. The mass of the solar system is 
(negligibly) less than the mass of the sun 
and the planets when taken separately. 
This fact implies that the entropy of 
these entities is lower than the entropy of 
the components taken separately. In 
other words, an entity at an energy equi-
librium is distinguishable by the fact that 
it has lower mass and lower entropy than 
its components taken separately.  
These entities are trivially self-perpetuat-
ing in that they are in what is often 
called an energy well and require energy 
to pull their components apart. This 
gives us a nice metric of entityness for 
at-equilibrium entities: the amount of 
energy required to pull it apart. 
                                                 
30
  It turns out that the atomic nucleus with the least 
mass per nucleon is iron. Energy from fusion is 
possible for elements lighter than iron; energy 
from fission is possible for elements heavier than 
iron. (See [Nave] for a discussion of these mat-
ters.) 
5.3 Entities and emergence are 
fundamental 
The mechanisms (gravity, the strong nu-
clear force, and the electromagnetic 
force) that expel entropy from at-equilib-
rium entities and that hold these entities 
together are the fundamental forces of 
nature.  
One can say that these mechanisms in 
some sense run for free. To the extent 
that we understand how they work at all, 
we attribute their operation to virtual 
particles that pop into and out of exis-
tence and that do the work of the force—
with  no extra effort expended anywhere 
else.  
There really is a free lunch. Atomic nu-
clei form, atoms form, solar systems and 
galaxies form—all without depleting any 
energy reservoirs. We are so used to this 
fact that we hardly notice it. But if one 
stands back and observes that at-
equilibrium entities exemplify emer-
gence at its most basic—an atom is 
emergent from, it is an epiphenomenon 
of, and it supervenes over its compo-
nents—we may conclude that spontane-
ous emergence is fundamental to how 
nature works. 
Even so, one might suppose that beyond 
combining in these basic ways (as 
atomic nuclei, atoms, and astronomical 
aggregations held together by gravity), 
at-equilibrium entities are not very inter-
esting. Standing back again makes it 
clear that this is not the case. Given what 
we have learned during the past half cen-
tury (and what we still don’t know)—
especially about condensed matter phys-
ics and including, as we said earlier, the 
startling fact that the same matter is ca-
pable of implementing multiple abstrac-
tions with radically different proper-
ties—at-equilibrium entities are far from 
boring.     
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5.4 Dissipative structures 
In [Prigogine] (and elsewhere) Prigogine 
discussed what he called a dissipative 
structure.  We see dissipative structures 
as the essential stepping stone from at-
equilibrium entities to autonomous enti-
ties. 
Intuitively, a dissipative structure typi-
cally manifests when energy is pumped 
into a bounded region. Dissipative struc-
tures typically involve structured activi-
ties internal to the region. A standard ex-
ample consists of the Bénard convection 
cycles that form in a liquid when one 
surface is heated and the opposite sur-
face is kept cool. (See Figure 4.) 
A number of interesting phenomena may 
be understood as dissipative structures. 
Consider the distribution of water over 
the earth. Water is transported from 
place to place via processes that include  
evaporation, atmospheric weather sys-
tem movements, precipitation, ground-
water flows, ocean current flows, etc. 
Taken as a global system, these cycles 
may be understood as a dissipative struc-
ture that is driven primarily by solar en-
ergy, which is pumped into the earth’s 
atmosphere and surface structures. All of 
this is played out against a static frame-
work defined and held in place by the 
earth’s surface and its gravitational field. 
We note that our definition of a dissipa-
tive structure is quite broad. It includes 
virtually any energy-consuming device 
that operates according to some design. 
Consider a digital watch. It converts an 
inflow of energy into an ongoing series 
of structured internal activities. Does a 
digital watch define a dissipative struc-
ture? One may argue that the design of a 
digital watch limits the ways in which it 
can respond to an energy inflow. There-
fore the structured activity that arises as 
energy is pumped into it should not be 
characterized as a dissipative structure.  
But any bounded region has only a lim-
ited number of ways in which it can re-
spond to an inflow of energy. We sug-
gest that it would be difficult if not im-
possible to formalize a principled dis-
tinction between the Bénard convection 
cycles that arise in a liquid when energy 
is pumped into it and the structured ac-
tivities within a digital watch.31 The pri-
mary difference seems to be that a digi-
tal watch has a much more constrained 
static structure and can respond in far 
fewer ways. 
Recall that we previously characterized 
Newtonian mechanics and the solid 
phase of matter as abstractions that mat-
ter implements under various conditions. 
We can do the same thing for dissipative 
structures and say that a dissipative 
structure appears within a bounded re-
gion when the materials within that re-
gion implement an energy-driven ab-
stract design.  
An apparent difference between the ab-
stract designs that dissipative structures 
implement and the abstract designs dis-
cussed earlier is that the abstract designs 
of dissipative structures seem to appear 
unbidden—we don’t expect them—
whereas the abstract designs discussed 
earlier are commonplace. The issue for 
the more commonplace abstract designs 
is how to conceptualize them, not why 
they appeared at all, whereas the abstract 
design that appear as dissipative struc-
tures seem to demand an answer to the 
question: why did they appear at all? In 
fact, both kinds of abstract design are 
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  One of the other common examples of a dissipa-
tive structure is the Belousov-Zhabotinsky (BZ) 
reaction, which in some ways is a chemical watch. 
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part of nature. The difference is that 
some are familiar; others aren’t.32 
If we understand a dissipative structure 
to be the implementation of an energy-
driven abstract design, the question for 
any dissipative structure becomes: what 
abstract design does it implement? In 
other words, how does it work—which 
is the same question one must ask about 
any abstract design. 
Like most abstract designs, those associ-
ated with dissipative structures generally 
exist only within limited energy ranges. 
Thus phase transitions may be expected 
as materials transform themselves be-
tween configurations in which they are 
and are not implanting the abstract de-
sign of a particular dissipative structure.  
In this section we have referred, some-
what awkwardly, to bounded regions 
within which dissipative structures form. 
We have refrained from calling these 
bounded regions entities. This may be 
pickiness on our part, but our notion is 
that an entity perpetuates itself. As de-
fined, bounded regions of materials that 
are capable of implementing dissipative 
structure abstract designs need not have 
the capacity to perpetuate themselves. 
Their boundaries may be imposed artifi-
cially. We shall have more to say about 
this in the section on natural vs. artificial 
autonomous entities. 
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  Reliance on a surprise factor as characteristic of 
emergence is, in our opinion, a common error. One 
often hears that emergent phenomena appear un-
bidden, that one’s surprise is fundamental to 
whether something should be considered emer-
gent. On the contrary, we claim that an observer’s 
surprise of lack of surprise should have nothing to 
do with how we should understand a phenomenon 
of nature. 
5.5 Integrating dissipative struc-
tures and at-equilibrium enti-
ties. 
A dissipative structure is a physical 
manifestation of a region of energy sta-
bility in an environment in which energy 
is flowing at a relatively constant rate. 
An at-equilibrium entity is similarly a 
physical manifestation of a region of 
stability—but in an environment in 
which there is no energy flow. We 
would welcome a formal integration of 
the two in which at-equilibrium entities 
are understood as dissipative structures 
in an environment in which the rate of 
energy flow is zero. Perhaps another 
way of putting this would be to charac-
terize the energy wells that exist in envi-
ronments that include energy flows.  
5.6 Autonomous entities 
The notion of an autonomous entity 
seems central to how we look at the 
world. 
• For millennia we have found it con-
venient to partition the world into two 
realms: the animate and the inanimate. 
The inanimate world is ruled by exter-
nal forces; the animate world is capa-
ble of autonomous action. Recall that 
this is why Brownian motion posed 
such a problem: how can inanimate 
particles look so much like they are 
moving autonomously?  
• For the past half-millennium western 
civilization (and more recently civili-
zation world-wide) has pursued, with 
significant success, the dream of creat-
ing autonomous sources of action. We 
have built machines about which it can 
be said that in varying degrees they act 
on their own.  We do not yet confuse 
our machines with biological life, and 
we have not yet managed to construct 
biological life “from scratch.” But the 
differences between human artifacts 
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and natural biological life are becom-
ing more and more subtle—and they 
are likely to disappear within the life-
times of many of us.  
• Most people will acknowledge that the 
kinds of entities that the biological and 
social sciences deal with seem some-
how different from those of physics 
and chemistry. A major part of that 
difference is the apparent ability of the 
entities in those sciences to act on their 
own, i.e., their autonomy. 
So, what do we mean by autonomy? 
Certainly, we no longer believe in any-
thing like vitalism, i.e., that there is such 
a thing as a “life force” the possession of 
which differentiates the animate from 
the inanimate. But when we speak of 
autonomous entities, have we done much 
more than substitute the word autono-
mous for other words? Do we have a 
serviceable definition of what it means 
to be autonomous? 
In non-political contexts, the term auton-
omous is generally taken to mean some-
thing like self-directed or not controlled 
by outside forces.33 But definitions of 
this sort don’t help much. Perhaps self-
directed is what we mean by autono-
mous. But what do we mean by self-
directed? 
Furthermore any entity (in our sense of 
an entity as having some material aspect) 
is subject to outside, i.e., physical, 
forces. Nothing is free from the laws of 
physics. So it may not make any sense to 
demand that to be autonomous an entity 
must not be controlled by outside forces. 
The intuition behind self-directed and 
the connection to outside forces may 
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  See, for example, the American Heritage® Dic-
tionary definition. URL as of 9/15/2005: 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/86/A0538600.html. 
give us a clue, however. Perhaps one can 
require that an autonomous entity con-
trol—at least to some extent and in what 
may be considered a self-directed way, 
although without implying willfulness—
how it is affected by outside forces.  
Putting these ideas together, we suggest 
that a useful way to think about auton-
omy may be that an entity is autonomous 
to the extent that it shapes the way it is 
affected by outside forces.  
But this is pretty much how we have de-
fined a dissipative structure. A dissipa-
tive structure results from the operation 
of an energy-driven abstract design. In 
other words, a dissipative structure re-
sults when an energy-driven abstract de-
sign shapes the way outside forces oper-
ate within a bounded region. 
Because this seems to be such a nice fit 
with our intuition of what it means for an 
entity to be autonomous, we will define 
an autonomous entity as an entity that is 
implementing the abstract design of a 
dissipative structure.34 
In other words, we define an autono-
mous entity as a self-perpetuating region 
of reduced entropy that is implementing 
a dissipative structure’s abstract design. 
By definition, autonomous entities con-
sume energy and are far from equilib-
rium. We suggest that most if not all of 
the entities of the higher level sciences 
satisfy our definition of an autonomous 
entity.  
Note that most biological, social, and 
economic autonomous entities are even 
more autonomous than our definition 
suggests. Most of these entities acquire 
energy in some “frozen” form such as 
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  This intuitive fit may be one reason that the notion 
of a dissipative structure generated as much enthu-
siasm as it has. 
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food or money35 and convert it to energy 
according to their internal designs. Thus 
they do more than simply shape how 
“raw” energy that they encounter affects 
them. They are often able to save energy 
and to chose in some sense when to use 
it. 
5.7 A naturally occurring autono-
mous entity that is neither 
biological nor social  
We suggest that a hurricane qualifies as 
an autonomous entity. (See Figure 3.) In 
simple terms (paraphrased from 
[NASA]), the internal design of a hurri-
cane involves a greater than normal 
pressure differential between the ocean 
surface and the upper atmosphere. That 
pressure differential causes moist surface 
air to rise. When the moisture-laden air 
reaches the upper atmosphere, which is 
cooler, it condenses, releasing heat. The 
heat warms the air and reduces the pres-
sure, thereby maintaining the pressure 
differential—a marvelous design for a 
self-perpetuating process.  
In effect, a hurricane is a heat engine in 
which condensation, which replaces 
combustion as the source of heat, occurs 
in the upper atmosphere.36 Thus, al-
though physically very large, a hurricane 
has a relatively simple design, which 
causes it to consume energy and which 
allows it to perpetuate itself as an area of 
reduced entropy.  
5.8 Natural and artificial autono-
mous entities 
Most of our energy consuming machines 
also qualify as autonomous entities. The 
primary difference between human pro-
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  The maxim follow the money is really advising to 
follow the energy. 
36
  A characterization of hurricanes as “vertical heat 
engines” may be found in Wikipedia. URL as of 
9/1/2005: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane 
duced autonomous entities and naturally 
occurring ones is that the naturally oc-
curring autonomous entities use at least 
some of the energy they consume to per-
petuate themselves as entities. In con-
trast, human-produced autonomous enti-
ties are almost always at-equilibrium en-
tities through which energy flows. In 
other words, the nature of human-
produced autonomous entities is that 
their persistence as entities tends to be 
independent of their use of the energy 
that flows through them. This tends not 
to be the case with naturally occurring 
autonomous entities. 
One of the senses of the word natural is 
to have properties characteristic of ele-
ments found in nature. We suggest that 
the distinction between entities that rely 
on an at-equilibrium frame and those 
that more actively construct their 
framework is one of the central intuitive 
differences between what we call artifi-
cial and what we call natural. A hurri-
cane would thus be considered a natu-
rally occurring autonomous entity which 
is neither biological nor social. 
As an example of a naturally occurring 
at-equilibrium entity that becomes 
autonomous, consider an atom that is be-
ing excited by a photon stream. Because 
of its design it captures the energy of the 
photons, which it releases at some later 
time in what may be a slightly different 
form. This is the basis of the laser.  
5.9 Autonomous entities and 
phase transitions 
Many autonomous entities exhibit the 
equivalent of phases—and phase transi-
tions. Such phases differ from phases in 
at-equilibrium entities in that they reflect 
different ways in which the autonomous 
entity makes use of the energy that is 
flowing through it. Examples include 
gaits (walking, running, etc.), heart beats 
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(regular and fibrillation), and possibly 
psychological conditions such as mania, 
depression and psychosis.  
The primary concern about global warm-
ing is not that the temperature will rise 
by a degree or two—although the melt-
ing of the ice caps resulting from that is 
potentially destructive—but the possibil-
ity that if the temperature warms suffi-
ciently, a phase transition will occur, and 
the global climate structure, including 
atmospheric and oceanic currents, will 
change abruptly—and possibly disas-
trously. 
As we suggest later, the fact that paral-
lels exist between autonomous and at-
equilibrium entities leads to the sugges-
tion that one might be able to integrate 
the two and see at-equilibrium entities as 
one end of a continuum that includes 
both at-equilibrium and autonomous en-
tities. 
5.10 Autonomous entities and en-
ergy flows 
Autonomous entities require energy 
flows for survival. But the kinds of en-
ergy flows available are limited. The 
most familiar (at least here on earth) is 
the flow of energy from the sun. Plants 
exploit it. We are also familiar with arti-
ficial energy flows, as in the flow of 
electricity to a device when the switch is 
turned on. Other than these, what other 
flows of energy support autonomous en-
tities?  
Thermal vents in the ocean are one pos-
sibility. Yet the primary food producers 
in thermal vents are bacteria that convert 
chemicals from the vents to more use-
able forms of energy.37 It is not clear 
what role, if any, is played by the flow 
                                                 
37
  See, for example, Comm Tech Lab and University 
of Delaware. 
of thermal energy itself. It would be sig-
nificant if a life-form were found that 
used thermal energy directly to power an 
internal process in a way that paralleled 
the way plants use energy from the sun. 
It may be that some of the chemical re-
actions that occur in inhabitants of vent 
ecologies depend on a high ambient 
temperature. But that seems to be a dif-
ferent sort of dependency than using a 
direct energy flow. 
Most biological autonomous entities ac-
quire their energy in a packaged form, 
e.g., as “food” of some sort rather than 
as a direct energy flow. Once the energy 
resource has been ingested, energy is ex-
tracted from it. This is even the case 
with our hurricane example. The energy 
of condensation is produced within the 
hurricane after warm moist air is “in-
gested.”  
This seems to be another distinction be-
tween naturally occurring and artificial 
autonomous entities. No artificial enti-
ties procure their own energy resources. 
Other than plants, all naturally occurring 
autonomous entities do. 
5.11 Theseus’s ship 
The distinction between natural and arti-
ficial entities sheds some light on the 
paradox of Theseus’s ship, a ship that 
was maintained (repaired, repainted, 
etc.) in a harbor for so long that all of its 
original material had been replaced. 
Does one say that it is “the same ship” 
from year to year? 
We would like to distinguish between 
two ways of looking at Theseus’s ship. 
One way is to consider the material ship 
as it exists at any one moment. By our 
definition, this is an entity—although it 
is not an autonomous entity—since it is 
at an energy equilibrium. It is held to-
gether by a large number of relatively 
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shallow energy wells. Entities of this 
sort are particularly vulnerable to every-
day weathering and wear and tear. It 
doesn’t take much to push some of the 
energy wells beyond their limits.  
A second way to look at Theseus’s ship 
is to include the maintenance process as 
part of a larger autonomous ship entity. 
The ship along with its maintenance 
process is an entity because it is a self-
perpetuating region of reduced entropy. 
It is a relatively simple example of a so-
cial autonomous entity. Both materials 
and people cycle through it, but the 
process perpetuates itself by using en-
ergy from the society in which it is em-
bedded. 
So our answer to the question of whether 
“the same ship” is in the harbor from 
year to year is “No” if we are thinking 
about the material ship and “Yes” if we 
are thinking about the larger ship-plus-
maintenance entity.  
By our definition, the larger ship-plus-
maintenance entity would be considered 
natural rather than artificial because it as 
a social process and is not at-equilib-
rium; it uses some of the energy it con-
sumes to perpetuate itself. We would 
consider most social entities to be natu-
ral in this sense even though they are 
constructed and maintained by people. 
5.12 Autonomous entities may act 
in the world 
As we know, hurricanes can cause sig-
nificant damage. So far we haven’t 
talked about how that might happen.  
Since energy flows through autonomous 
entities, part of that flowing through in-
volves flowing out. In other words, 
autonomous entities may include as part 
of their designs means for projecting 
force into the world by directing outward 
flows of energy.38  
Furthermore, the internal design of most 
autonomous entities enable them (a) to 
store energy, (b) to move it about inter-
nally, and (c) to tap it as needed. 
5.13 Autonomous entities tend not 
to supervene over their static 
components  
As we said earlier, an at-equilibrium en-
tity consists of a fixed collection of 
component elements over which it su-
pervenes. In contrast, autonomous enti-
ties for the most part tend not to consist 
of a fixed collection of matter. Our hur-
ricane is a good example. A hurricane 
may be relatively stable as a reduced en-
tropy region—even though its bounda-
ries may be somewhat vague. But how-
ever its boundaries are defined, the ma-
terial within its boundaries tends to vary 
from moment to moment as the hurri-
cane’s winds move air and water about. 
Similarly, most biological entities recy-
cle their physical components, and most 
social entities (e.g., families) and eco-
nomic entities (e.g., corporations) re-
main intact as the people who fill vari-
ous roles cycle through them. Theseus’s 
ship—when understood as including its 
maintenance process as discussed above 
—is another example of an autonomous 
entity that recycles its physical compo-
nents. 
Because of this recycling property, most 
autonomous entities don’t supervene 
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  This solves a problem that concerned Leibniz with 
respect to monads: how do they interact. Leibniz’s 
answer was that they don’t. Our autonomous enti-
ties interact with each other and with the rest of the 
world though energy flows over which they have 
the ability to exert some control. Of course our 
autonomous entities can exert that control because 
they have internal designs; Leibniz’s monads 
didn’t. 
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over any collection of matter that gives 
us any intellectual leverage.   
It is easiest to see this when we consider 
gliders in the Game of Life, about which 
this is true as well. In the Appendix we 
show how to formalize the notion of a 
Game of Life pattern. In simplest terms 
we define what we call a live cell group 
to be a connected group of live (i.e., 
“on”) cells. We define a pattern as a 
connected sequence of live cell groups. 
In general, such sequences may branch 
or terminate, but the glider pattern is a 
linear sequence of live cell groups. (See 
the Appendix for the details, which 
pretty much match one’s intuition.) A 
glider is such a pattern. 
One may define the state of a glider pat-
tern to be the particular configuration it 
is in (See Figure 2 earlier for the four 
possible configurations.)  Alternatively, 
one may also define the state of a glider 
pattern in either of two ways: the con-
figuration (of the four) in which the pat-
tern exists or the configuration along 
with the pattern’s location on the grid. 
To satisfy supervenience, for a glider 
pattern to supervene over a set of Game 
of Life cells requires that if the glider is 
in different states then the grid cells 
must also be in a different state.  
Given either of our two definitions of 
state, gliders (if undisturbed) do not su-
pervene over any finite set of grid cells.  
Given any such finite set of cells, a 
glider may assume multiple states when 
beyond that set, thereby violating super-
venience.   
The only sets of cells over which a glider 
supervenes is a superset of (an infinite 
subset of cells within) what one might 
call the glider’s “glide path,” the strip of 
cells that a glider will traverse if undis-
turbed. The parenthetical qualification 
allows for the possibility that one can 
differentiate states without looking at the 
entire glider pattern.  
In other words, any set of cells over 
which a glider supervenes must include a 
potentially infinite subset of the cells 
with which the glider comes in contact 
over its lifetime. This may be super-
venience, but it is supervenience in a not 
very useful way. 
To connect this to autonomous entities, 
imagine a glider pattern as fixed with the 
grid moving underneath it, i.e., as if the 
glider cycles grid cells through itself. 
This is quite similar to how most 
autonomous entities operate. These enti-
ties typically cycle matter through them-
selves. The same reasoning shows that 
such autonomous entities don’t super-
vene over any useful subset of matter 
other than the collection of all mater 
with which they may come in contact 
during their lifetimes.  
It appears that the concept of superven-
ience may not be as useful as one might 
have hoped for thinking about epiphe-
nomena and emergence—at least in the 
case of autonomous entities. 
5.14 Entities, objects, and agents 
Computer Science has also developed a 
distinction between entities that do and 
do not act autonomously. Recall that our 
definition of entity depended on distin-
guishing an entity from its environment, 
i.e., it was a region of reduced entropy. 
We may therefore refer to the “inside” of 
an entity and to whatever internal struc-
ture and state it may have. This also al-
lows us also to speak of the interface 
(boundary) between an entity and its en-
vironment.  
If an entity has an internal state, what, if 
anything, may cause that state to 
change? Are there outside influences 
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that may cause an entity to change state? 
If so, what mechanism enables those in-
fluences to act on the entity? Alterna-
tively, may an entity change state as a 
result of purely internal activity? 
In Computer Science two concepts have 
emerged as fundamental to these issues: 
objects and agents. There is a reasonable 
consensus in Computer Science about 
what we mean by an object, namely an 
encapsulation of a mechanisms for as-
suming and changing states along with 
means for acting on that encapsulated 
mechanism.  
There is far less agreement about the no-
tion of an agent. For our purposes, we 
will construe an agent as simply as pos-
sible. An agent for us will be an object 
(as defined above) that may act on its 
own. In software terms, this means that 
an agent is a software object that has an 
internal thread.39  
Given these definitions of object and 
agent, we suggest that to a first very 
rough approximation40 objects are the 
software equivalent of at-equilibrium en-
tities and agents are the software equiva-
lent of autonomous entities.  
5.15 Thermodynamic computing: 
nihil ex nihilo 
Note that when discussing software ob-
jects and agents, there is no concern with 
entropy: the software system maintains 
the integrity (and internal structure) of 
objects and agents. Similarly, we did not 
claim that gliders or Turing Machines 
were entities in the Game of Life. 
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  In adopting this definition, we are deliberately by-
passing issues of goals, beliefs, plans, etc., which 
appear in some formulations of agent-based mod-
eling frameworks. 
40
  See the next section for a discussion of why this 
approximation is indeed very rough. 
The problem has to do with the way we 
do Computer Science. In Computer Sci-
ence we assume that one can specify a 
Turing Machine, a Finite State Automa-
ton, a Cellular Automaton, or a piece of 
software, and it will do its thing—for 
free. Software runs for free. Turing ma-
chines run for free. Cellular Automata 
run for free. Gliders run for free. Agents 
in agent-based models run for free. Al-
though that may be a useful abstraction, 
we should recognize that we are leaving 
out something important. In the real 
world one needs energy to drive proc-
esses. To run real software in the real 
world requires a real computer, which 
uses real energy. We suggest that a the-
ory of thermodynamic computation is 
needed to integrate the notions of en-
ergy, entities, and computing.  
How do we capture the notion of the 
“energy” that enables software to do its 
“symbolic work?” Is computational 
complexity an equivalent concept? 
Computational complexity is concerned 
primarily with finding measures for how 
intrinsically difficult particular kinds of 
computations are. The focus seems dif-
ferent. 
Performance analysis is somewhat closer 
to what we are attempting to get at. But 
performance analysis is typically satis-
fied with relatively gross results, not 
with the fine details of how a computa-
tional energy budget is spent. 
The problem seems to be that the com-
putational energy that software uses is 
not visible to the software itself. Soft-
ware does not have to pay its energy bill; 
the rest of nature does. 
However this issue is resolved, for now a 
thread seems to be a useful software ana-
log for the energy flow that powers a 
dissipative structure. It also seems rea-
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sonable to use the term agent as syn-
onymous with autonomous entity. 
With this in mind, though, we should 
point out that the parallel between ob-
jects and agents on the one hand and at-
equilibrium and autonomous entities on 
the other isn’t perfect. An object in soft-
ware is not completely controlled by ex-
ternal forces. An object’s methods do 
shape how energy (in the form of threads 
that execute them) affects the object.  
Objects differ from agents in that they 
don’t have what might be considered an 
internal source of energy. Agents do. But 
our analogy breaks down entirely if an 
object is allowed to create a thread when 
one of its methods is executed. (Most 
multi-threaded programming languages 
allow the arbitrary creation of threads.) 
For an object to create a thread would be 
equivalent to an entity in nature creating 
an unlimited internal source of energy 
for itself once it came in contact with 
any external energy at all.  
As we said, a real theory of thermody-
namic computing is needed. 
5.16 Minimal autonomous entities 
In [Kauffman] Kauffman asks what the 
basic characteristics are of what he (also) 
calls autonomous agents. He suggests 
that the ability to perform a thermody-
namic (Carnot engine) work cycle is 
fundamental. 
In what may turn out to be the same an-
swer we suggest looking for the minimal 
biological organism that perpetuates it-
self by consuming energy. Bacteria seem 
to be too complex. Viruses41 and prions 
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  Viruses are an interesting contrast to our lactose 
example, however. In both cases, an at-equilibrium 
element in the environment triggers a process in an 
autonomous entity. In the case of lactose, the proc-
ess is advantageous to the entity; in the case of vi-
ruses, it is not advantageous to the entity. 
don’t consume energy.42 Is there any-
thing in between? We suggest that such 
a minimal autonomous entity may help 
us understand the yet-to-be-discovered 
transition from the inanimate to the ani-
mate.  
Since self-perpetuation does not imply 
reproduction (as hurricanes illustrate), 
simple self-perpetuating organisms may 
not be able to reproduce. That means 
that if they are to exist, it must be rela-
tively easy for them to come into being 
directly from inorganic materials. Simi-
larly, simple self-perpetuating organisms 
may not include any stable internal re-
cord—like DNA—of their design (as 
hurricanes again illustrate). One 
wouldn’t expect to see evolution among 
such organisms—at least not evolution 
that depends on modifications of such 
design descriptions.. 
6 The evolution of complex-
ity 
6.1 Stigmergy 
Once one has autonomous entities (or 
agents) that persist in their environment, 
the ways in which complexity can de-
velop grows explosively.  Prior to 
agents, to get something new, one had to 
build it as a layer on top of some exist-
ing substrate. As we have seen, nature 
has found a number of amazing abstrac-
tions along with some often surprising 
ways to implement them. Nonetheless, 
this construction mechanism is relatively 
ponderous. Layered hierarchies of ab-
stractions are powerful, but they are not 
what one might characterize as light-
weight or responsive to change. Agents 
change all that.  
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  Hurricanes aren’t biological. 
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Half a century ago, PierrePaul Grasse 
invented [Grasse] the term stigmergy to 
help describe how social insect societies 
function. The basic insight is that when 
the behavior of an entity depends to at 
least some extent on the state of its envi-
ronment, it is possible to modify that en-
tity’s behavior by changing the state of 
the environment. Grasse used the term 
“stigmergy” for this sort of indirect 
communication and control. This sort of 
interplay between agents and their envi-
ronment often produces epiphenomenal 
effects that are useful to the agents. Of-
ten those effects may be understood in 
terms of formal abstractions. Sometimes 
it is easier to understand them less for-
mally. 
Two of the most widely cited examples 
of stigmergic interaction are ant foraging 
and bird flocking. In ant foraging, ants 
that have found a food source leave 
pheromone markers that other ants use to 
make their way to that food source. In 
bird flocking, each bird determines how 
it will move at least in part by noting the 
positions and velocities of its neighbor-
ing birds.  
The resulting epiphenomena are that 
food is gathered and flocks form. Pre-
sumably these epiphenomena could be 
formalized in terms of abstract effects 
that obeyed a formal set of rules—in the 
same way that the rules for gliders and 
Turing Machines can abstracted away 
from their implementation by Game of 
Life rules. But often the effort required 
to generate such abstract theories doesn’t 
seem worth the effort—as long as the re-
sults are what one wants. 
Here are some additional examples of 
stigmergy. 
• When buyers and sellers interact in a 
market, one gets market epiphe-
nomena. Economics attempts to for-
malize how those interactions may be 
abstracted into theories. 
• We often find that laws, rules, and 
regulations have both intended and un-
intended consequences. In this case the 
laws, rules, and regulations serve as 
the environment within which agents 
act. As the environment changes, so 
does the behavior of the agents. 
• Both sides of the evo-devo (evolution-
development) synthesis [Carroll] ex-
hibit stigmergic emergence. On the 
“evo” side, species create environ-
mental effects for each other as do 
sexes within species.  
• The “devo” side is even more stigmer-
gic. Genes, the switches that control 
gene expression, and the proteins that 
genes produce when expressed all have 
environmental effects on each other.  
• Interestingly enough, the existence of 
gene switches was discovered in the 
investigation of another stigmergic 
phenomenon. Certain bacteria generate 
an enzyme to digest lactose, but they 
do it only when lactose is present. 
How do the bacteria “know” when to 
generate the enzyme?  
It turns out to be simple. The gene for 
the enzyme exists in the bacteria, but 
its expression is normally blocked by a 
protein that is attached to the DNA se-
quence just before the enzyme gene. 
This is called a gene expression 
switch.  
When lactose is in the environment, it 
infuses into the body of the bacteria 
and binds to the protein that blocks the 
expression of the gene. This causes the 
protein to detach from the DNA 
thereby “turning on” the gene and al-
lowing it to be expressed.  
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The lactose enzyme switch is a lovely 
illustration of stigmergic design. As 
we described the mechanism above, it 
seems that lactose itself turns on the 
switch that causes the lactose-digesting 
enzyme to be produced. If one were 
thinking about the design of such a 
system, one might imagine that the lac-
tose had been designed so that it would 
bind to that switch. But of course, lac-
tose wasn’t “designed” to do that. It 
existed prior to the switch. The bacte-
ria evolved a switch that lactose would 
bind to. So the lactose must be under-
stood as being part of the environment 
to which the bacteria adapted by 
evolving a switch to which lactose 
would bind. How clever; how simple; 
how stigmergic! 
• Cellular automata operate stigmergi-
cally. Each cell serves as an environ-
ment for its neighbors. As we have 
seen, epiphenomena may include glid-
ers and Turing Machines. 
• Even the operation of the Turing Ma-
chine as an abstraction may be under-
stood stigmergically. The head of a 
Turing Machine (the equivalent of an 
autonomous agent) consults the tape, 
which serves as its environment, to de-
termine how to act. By writing on the 
tape, it leaves markers in its environ-
ment to which it may return—not 
unlike the way foraging ants leave 
pheromone markers in their environ-
ment. When the head returns to a 
marker, that marker helps the head de-
termine how to act at that later time.  
• In fact, one may understand all compu-
tations as being stigmergic with re-
spect to a computer’s instruction exe-
cution cycle. Consider the following 
familiar code fragment. 
  F *?
*  F ?
  F  ?
The epiphenomenal result is that * and 
 are exchanged. But this result is not a 
consequence of any one statement. It is 
an epiphenomenon of the three state-
ments being executed in sequence by a 
computer’s instruction execution cy-
cle.  
Just as there in nothing in the rules of 
the Game of Life about gliders, there is 
nothing in a computer’s instruction 
execution cycle about exchanging the 
values of * and —or about any other 
algorithm that software implements. 
Those effects are all epiphenomenal. 
• The instruction execution cycle itself is 
epiphenomenal over the flow of elec-
trons through gates—which knows no 
more about the instruction execution 
cycle than the instruction execution 
cycle knows about algorithms. 
In all of the preceding examples it is 
relatively easy to identify the agent(s), 
the environment, and the resulting 
epiphenomena. 
6.2 Design and evolution 
It is not surprising that designs appear in 
nature. It is almost tautologous to say 
that those things whose designs work in 
the environments in which they find 
themselves will persist in those envi-
ronments. This is a simpler (and more 
accurate) way of saying that it is the 
fit—entities with designs that fit their 
environment—that survive.  
6.3 The accretion of complexity 
An entity that suits its environment per-
sists in that environment. But anything 
that persists in an environment by that 
very fact changes that environment for 
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everything else. This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as an ever chang-
ing fitness landscape.  
What has been less widely noted in the 
complexity literature is that when some-
thing is added to an environment it may 
enable something else to be added lat-
ter—something that could not have ex-
isted in that environment prior to the ear-
lier addition. 
This is an extension of notions from 
ecology, biology, and the social sci-
ences. A term for this phenomenon from 
the ecology literature, is succession. 
(See, for example, [Trani].) Historically 
succession has been taken to refer to a 
fairly rigid sequence of communities of 
species, generally leading to what is 
called a climax or (less dramatically) a 
steady state. 
Our notion is closer to that of bricolage, 
a notion that originated with the struc-
turalism movement of the early 20th cen-
tury [Wiener] and which is now used in 
both biology and the social sciences. 
Bricolage means the act or result of 
tinkering, improvising, or building 
something out of what is at hand.  
In genetics bricolage refers to the evolu-
tionary process as one that tinkers with 
an existing genome to produce some-
thing new. [Church].  
John Seely Brown, former chief scientist 
for the Xerox Corporation and former di-
rector of the Xerox Palo Alto Research 
Center captured its sense in a recent talk.  
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Ciborra [Ciborra] uses bricolage to 
characterize the way that organizations 
tailor their information systems to their 
changing needs through continual tinker-
ing.  
This notion of building one thing upon 
another applies to our framework in that 
anything that persists in an environment 
changes that environment for everything 
else. The Internet provides many inter-
esting illustrations.  
• Because the Internet exists at all, ac-
cess to a very large pool of people is 
available. This enabled the develop-
ment of websites such as eBay.  
• The establishment of eBay as a persis-
tent feature of the Internet environment 
enabled the development of enterprises 
whose only sales outlet was eBay. 
These are enterprises with neither 
brick and mortar nor web storefronts. 
The only place they sell is on eBay. 
This is a nice example of ecological 
succession. 
• At the same time—and again because 
the Internet provides access to a very 
large number of people—other organi-
zations were able to establish what are 
known as massively multi-player 
online games. Each of these games is a 
simulated world in which participants 
interact with the game environment 
and with each other. In most of these 
games, participants seek to acquire vir-
tual game resources, such as magic 
swords. Often it takes a fair amount of 
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  In passing, Brown claims that this is how most 
new technology develops. 
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time, effort, and skill to acquire such 
resources. 
• The existence of all of these factors re-
sulted, though a creative leap, in an 
eBay market in which players sold vir-
tual game assets for real money. This 
market has become so large that there 
are now websites dedicated exclu-
sively to trading in virtual game assets. 
[Wallace]  
• BBC News reported [BBC] that there 
are companies that hire low-wage 
Mexican and Chinese teenagers to earn 
virtual assets, which are then sold in 
these markets. How long will it be be-
fore a full-fledged economy develops 
around these assets? There may be 
brokers and retailers who buy and sell 
these assets for their own accounts 
even though they do not intend to play 
the game. (Perhaps they already exist.) 
Someone may develop a service that 
tracks the prices of these assets. Per-
haps futures and options markets will 
develop along with the inevitable in-
vestment advisors. 
The point is that once something fits 
well enough into its environment to per-
sist it adds itself to the environment for 
everything else. This creates additional 
possibilities and a world with ever in-
creasing complexity.  
In each of the examples mentioned 
above, one can identify what we have 
been calling an autonomous entity. In 
most cases, these entities are self-
perpetuating in that the amount of 
money they extract from the environ-
ment (by selling either products, ser-
vices, or advertising) is more than 
enough to pay for the resources needed 
to keep it in existence.  
In other cases, some Internet entities run 
on time and effort contributed by volun-
teers. But the effect is the same. As long 
as an entity is self-perpetuating, it be-
comes part of the environment and can 
serve as the basis for the development of 
additional entities. 
6.4 Increasing complexity in-
creasing efficiency, and his-
torical contingency 
The phenomenon whereby new entities 
are built on top of existing entities is 
now so widespread and commonplace 
that it may seem gratuitous even to 
comment on it. But it is an important 
phenomenon, and one that has not re-
ceived the attention it deserves.  
Easy though this phenomenon is to un-
derstand once one sees it, it is not trivial. 
After all, the second law of thermody-
namics tells us that overall entropy in-
creases and complexity diminishes. Yet 
we see complexity, both natural and man 
made, continually increasing. For the 
most part, this increasing complexity 
consists of the development of new 
autonomous entities, entities that imple-
ment the abstract designs of dissipative 
structures. 
This does not contradict the Second 
Law. Each autonomous entity maintains 
its own internally reduced entropy by us-
ing energy imported from the environ-
ment to export entropy to the environ-
ment. Overall entropy increases. Such a 
process works only in an environment 
that itself receives energy from outside 
itself. Within such an environment, 
complexity increases. 
Progress in science and technology and 
the bountifulness of the marketplace all 
exemplify this pattern of increasing 
complexity. One might refer to this kind 
of pattern as a meta-epiphenomenon 
since it is an epiphenomenon of the 
process that creates epiphenomena. 
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This creative process also tends to ex-
hibit a second meta-epiphenomenon. 
Overall energy utilization becomes con-
tinually more efficient. As new autono-
mous entities find ways to use previ-
ously unused or under-used energy flows 
(or forms of energy flows that had not 
existed until some newly created 
autonomous entity  generated them, per-
haps as a waste product), more of the 
energy available to the system as a 
whole is put to use.  
The process whereby new autonomous 
entities come into existence and perpetu-
ate themselves is non-reductive. It is 
creative, contingent, and almost entirely 
a sequence of historical accidents. As 
they say, history is just one damn thing 
after another—to which we add, and na-
ture is a bricolage. We repeat the obser-
vation Anderson made more than three 
decades ago. 
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7 Entities, emergence, and 
science 
7.1 Entities and the sciences 
One reason that the sciences at levels 
higher than physics and chemistry seem 
somehow softer than physics and chem-
istry is that they work with autonomous 
entities, entities that for the most part do 
not supervene over any conveniently 
compact collection of matter. Entities in 
physics and chemistry are satisfyingly 
solid—or at least they seemed to be be-
fore quantum theory. In contrast, the en-
tities of the higher level sciences are not 
defined in terms of material boundaries. 
These entities don’t exist as stable 
clumps of matter; it’s hard to hold them 
completely in one’s hand—or in the grip 
of an instrument.  
The entities of the special sciences are 
objectively real—there is some objective 
measure (their reduced entropy relative 
to their environment) by which they 
qualify as entities. But as we saw earlier, 
the processes through which these enti-
ties interact and by means of which they 
perpetuate themselves are epiphenome-
nal. Even though the activities of higher 
level entities may be described in terms 
that are independent of the forces that 
produce them (recall that this is our 
definition of epiphenomenal), the fun-
damental forces of physics are the only 
forces in nature. There is no strong 
emergence. All other force-like effects 
are epiphenomenal. 
Consequently we find ourselves in the 
position of claiming that the higher level 
sciences study epiphenomenal interac-
tions among real if often somewhat ethe-
real entities.  
7.2 Science and emergence 
The idea that one can use heat and the 
expansion of gases that it produces to 
implement a particular function is not a 
concept of fundamental physics. Of 
course the Carnot engine is a conse-
quence of fundamental physics, but it is 
not a concept of fundamental physics. 
The idea of using a force to implement 
new functionality is simply not within 
the realm of fundamental physics.  
Physics, like most science, does not con-
sider new functionality. It examines ex-
isting phenomena, and it asks how they 
are brought about. It does not ask how 
knowledge gained from such an analysis 
can be used to implement something 
new. 
Here is a representative definition of the 
term science. 
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Science is thus the study of nature, how 
it is designed, i.e., organized, and how 
its designs work. Science does not have 
as part of its charter to take what is 
known about nature and to create some-
thing new.  
Recall our discussion of hurricanes. Ap-
parently they are the only kind of 
weather system with an internal power 
plant. Let’s imagine that no hurricane 
ever existed—at least not anywhere that 
an earthbound scientist could observe it. 
Under those circumstances no scientist 
would hypothesize the possibility of 
such a weather system. Doing so just 
isn’t part of the scientific agenda; it is 
not the kind of task that scientists set for 
themselves.  
Why waste one’s time thinking about 
something so strange—a weather system 
that not only contains its own built-in 
power plant but one in which the heat is 
generated by condensation rather than 
combustion and the “furnace” in which 
the heat is generated is located in the up-
per atmosphere. Thinking through such a 
possibility might make interesting sci-
ence fiction. 
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Certainly nothing so bizarre could ever 
occur naturally. It would not be consid-
ered science. 
Imagine also how bizarre phase transi-
tions would seem if they weren’t so 
common—matter sometimes obeying 
one set of rules and sometimes obeying 
another set. It wouldn’t make any sense. 
What would happen at the boundaries? 
How would transitions occur? If phase 
transitions didn’t happen naturally, sci-
ence almost certainly wouldn’t invent 
them.  
If we conceive of science as the study of 
existing phenomena, science is reduc-
tionism. To paraphrase Weinberg, the 
goal of science is  
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When science is understood in this way, 
mathematics, computer science, and en-
gineering, all of which create and study 
conceptual structures that need not exist, 
are not science. Indeed scientists and 
mathematicians are often surprised when 
they find that a mathematical construct 
that had been studied simply because it 
seemed mathematically interesting has a 
scientific application. 
Fortunately for us, nature is not a scien-
tist. Like computer scientists and engi-
neers, she too creates things that need 
not exist—people and hurricanes, for ex-
ample.  
What about this paper? We would cate-
gorize this paper as science because one 
of its goals is to help explain, i.e., to 
provide some intellectual leverage for 
understanding, why the nature is the way 
it is. 
This immediately raises another ques-
tion: if this is science, are we happy with 
it? Let’s assume that the simplest and 
most universal way to understand nature 
is in terms of multilevel abstractions. Is 
this satisfactory? Is this approach to sci-
entific explanation as real and as con-
crete as explaining nature in terms of 
more absolute single-level laws? Isn’t 
there something unreal about explaining 
nature at least in part as implementations 
of abstractions?  
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One way to argue for the reality of these 
abstractions is to show that they build 
upon each other. When a new abstrac-
tion is implemented in terms of the func-
tionalities embodied in existing ab-
stractions, there seems little choice but 
to acknowledge the reality of the imple-
menting abstractions.  
The obvious place to look for sciences 
building upon other sciences is the hier-
archy of the sciences. To take the most 
concrete case, chemistry is built on the 
abstraction of the atom as an entity with 
an internal structure. Yet we certainly 
don’t wonder about whether chemistry is 
a real science.  
Molecules are the (emergent) entities of 
chemistry. They form when combina-
tions of atoms in are in a lower energy 
state than the atoms would be in isola-
tion.  How does nature implement this? 
It does it in terms of abstract structures 
known as orbitals.  
Molecules form when orbitals from pairs 
of atoms merge. What is an orbital? It is 
part of the abstract design—the design 
that determines how electrons and pro-
tons relate to each other—that matter 
implements by following the rules of 
quantum mechanics. Thus molecular 
bonds are implemented by nature 
through the quantum mechanical mecha-
nisms of orbitals. Like the formation of 
atoms themselves, chemical bonding is 
part of the free lunch that nature sets out 
for us—and another illustration that 
emergence is a fundamental aspect of 
nature.  
Of course, this is just one example. As 
we shall saw above, the complexity that 
we see around us is a direct result of the 
fact that new abstractions may be built 
on top of the functionalities provided by 
existing abstractions. 
8 Varieties of Emergence 
In this section we stand back and review 
the kinds of emergence we have dis-
cussed. In particular we discuss two 
categories of emergence: static emer-
gence and dynamic emergence. We also 
suggest that these categories correspond 
to Weinberg’s notion of petty and grand 
reductionism. 
As in the case of Weinberg’s petty and 
grand reductionism, static emergence, 
while of great importance, is of lesser in-
terest. It is dynamic emergence, and es-
pecially stigmergic dynamic emergence 
that is central to complex systems. 
Recall that we defined a phenomenon as 
emergent over a underlying model if 
(a) it has an independent conceptualiza-
tion and (b) it can be implemented in 
terms of elements of that model. 
8.1 Static emergence 
An emergent phenomenon is statically 
emergent if its implementation does not 
depend on time.  
As an interesting example of static 
emergence, consider cloth as a collection 
of threads woven together. Cloth has the 
emergent property that it is able to cover 
a surface. This property is implicitly two 
dimensional. The components of cloth, 
i.e., threads, do not have (or at least are 
not understood in terms of) that prop-
erty. A thread is understood in terms of 
the property length. Yet when threads 
are woven together the resulting cloth 
has this new property, which effectively 
converts a collection of one dimensional 
components to a two dimensional object.  
Many human manufactured or con-
structed artifacts exhibit static emer-
gence. A house has the statically emer-
gent property number-of-bedrooms. 
More generally, a house has the emer-
gent property that it can serve as a resi-
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dence. Static emergence also occurs in 
nature. As Weinberg points out, 
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Since statically emergent phenomena 
must be implemented in terms of some 
underlying model, and since time is by 
definition excluded from that implemen-
tation, static emergence is equivalent to 
Weinberg’s petty reductionism. 
8.2 Dynamic  emergence 
Properties or phenomena of a model are 
dynamically emergent if they are defined 
in terms of how the model changes (or 
doesn’t change) over some time. Dy-
namic emergence occurs either with or 
without autonomous entities. We call the 
former stigmergic emergence, but we 
look at non-stigmergic dynamic emer-
gence first. 
8.3 Non-stigmergic dynamic 
emergence 
Interactions among at-equilibrium enti-
ties result in non-stigmergic dynamic 
emergence. Two examples are: 
(a) objects moving in space and interact-
ing according to Newtonian mechanics 
and (b) the quantum wave function.  
What appears to be distinctive about 
such systems is that they are not charac-
terized in terms of discrete states that 
their elements assume. Elements do not 
transition from one state to another. 
Such systems may be defined in terms of 
continuous equations. 
The quantum wave function is an espe-
cially interesting example. As long as it 
does not undergo decoherence, i.e., in-
teraction with an environment, the wave 
function encompasses all possibilities,  
but it realizes none of them. 
Since quantum states are discrete (hence 
the term quantum), objects cannot transi-
tion smoothly from one quantum state to 
another. So how does that transition oc-
cur? Quantum theory turns these transi-
tions into probabilities. As Hardy points 
out [Hardy], by making such transitions 
probabilistically continuous,  
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For all practical purposes, actually to as-
sume a state requires something more, 
the so-called collapse of the wave func-
tion. That happens stigmergically. At the 
quantum level, stigmergy is equivalent 
to decoherence. 
8.4 Dynamic emergence and 
grand reductionism 
As static emergence corresponds to 
Weinberg’s petty reductionism, dynamic 
emergence seems to correspond nicely to 
Weinberg’s grand reductionism. Wein-
berg explains grand reductionism as fol-
lows  
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We hope that Weinberg would not object 
to the following paraphrase. 
The reductionist goal (with respect to 
reducing weather terminology to the 
terminology of physics) is to build a 
model (a) whose elements include air, 
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water vapor, and radiation and 
(b) whose elements interact according 
to the principles of physics. When that 
model is run it will generate the emer-
gent phenomena that we would recog-
nize as cold fronts and thunderstorms. 
Grand reductionism is thus the explana-
tion of phenomena at one level in terms 
of phenomena at a more fundamental 
level. One shows that when the laws at 
the more fundamental level are applied, 
the result will be the phenomena of in-
terest at the less fundamental level. 
Since these sorts of models are inevita-
bly dynamic this is dynamic emergence 
but expressed in other terms. 
Nor should the equating of grand reduc-
tionism with dynamic emergence sur-
prise anyone in the field of complex sys-
tems. After all, the presumed reason to 
build a model is to show that a set of 
lower level rules will produce higher 
level results—which is exactly the grand 
reductionist agenda.  
Of course the terminology that we would 
use is not just that lower level rules pro-
duce higher level results, that lower level 
rules may implement a higher level ab-
straction. 
But no matter how it is expressed, with-
out the lower level substrate, the higher 
level phenomena would not exist. 
8.5 Stigmergic emergence 
Stigmergic emergence is dynamic emer-
gence that involves autonomous entities. 
What tends to be most interesting about 
autonomous entities are (a) they may as-
sume discrete states and (b) they change 
state as they interact with their environ-
ments.44  
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  One might liken an isolated quantum wave system 
to the inside of an autonomous entity. It assumes a 
Furthermore, not only do autonomous 
entities depend on their environments as 
sources of energy and other resources, 
the environment on which any autono-
mous entity depends includes other 
autonomous entities. Of course these 
other autonomous entities also depend 
on their environment, etc. These de-
pendencies form networks of enormous 
and complexity in which the dependency 
links are frequently not higher depend-
ing on lower. 
Static and non-stigmergic dynamic 
emergence is fairly well-behaved. One 
can often write down equations that 
characterize entire systems in which it 
occurs—even though it may not be prac-
tical to solve those equations for other 
than trivial cases. Stigmergic emergence 
is far worse. Because of the relative in-
terdependence of the components, it is 
virtually impossible to provide a global 
equation-like characterization of the sys-
tem as a whole. Stigmergic emergence is 
the source of the complexity in nature. It 
is because of stigmergic emergence that 
complex systems are complex. 
This would seem to put a final stake in 
the heart of Laplace’s demon, the hypo-
thetical computing device that if given 
details about the initial state of the uni-
verse would be able to compute all fu-
ture states. Laplace’s demon may suc-
ceed in a Newtonian universe, for which 
it was invented. Laplace’s demon may 
even succeed in a quantum mechanical 
universe in that the quantum wave equa-
tion is deterministic—even though it 
characterizes probability amplitudes and 
hence its collapse is not. But if nature 
includes asynchronously acting autono-
mous entities, some of which may them-
                                                                   
state (i.e., collapses) when it interacts with its en-
vironment
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selves embody quantum probability tran-
sitions, many of which are mutually in-
terdependent, and all of which depend 
on their environment, which includes 
other autonomous entities for their op-
eration and persistence, Laplace’s de-
mon will be way beyond its depth. 
One possible simple formal model for 
such a computational system is a shared 
tape Turing Machine community: a col-
lection of asynchronously operating Tur-
ing Machines that share a single tape.45  
Some proponents of agent-based model-
ing argue for that approach on the 
grounds that even though some domains 
may have global characterizations, those 
characterizations are much too complex 
to compute. Our position is that agent-
based modeling is appropriate because 
that’s how nature is.  
9 Some practical considera-
tions 
9.1 Emergence and software 
As noted earlier, the computation that 
results when software is executed is 
emergent. It is an epiphenomenon of the 
operation of the (actual or virtual) ma-
chine that executes the software.  
Earlier we defined emergence as syn-
onymous with epiphenomenon. At that 
time we suggested that formalizable 
epiphenomena are often of significant 
interest. We also said that formalization 
may not always be in the cards. Soft-
ware, which one would imagine to be a 
perfect candidate for formalization, now 
seems to be a good example of an 
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  Wegner’s work [Wegner] on non-traditional Tur-
ing Machine models begins to explore his own 
models. Cockshott and Michaelson [Cockshott] 
dispute whether Wegner’s models extend the 
power of the Turing machine. 
epiphenomenon that is unlikely to be 
formalized.  
It had once been hoped that software de-
velopment could evolve to a point at 
which one need only write down a for-
mal specification of what one wanted the 
software to do. Then some automatic 
process would produce software that sat-
isfied that specification.  
That dream now seems quite remote. 
Besides the difficulty of developing (a) a 
satisfactory specification language and 
(b) a system that can translate specifica-
tions written in such a language into ex-
ecutable code, the real problem is that it 
has turned out to be at least as difficult 
and complex to write formal specifica-
tions as it is to write the code that pro-
duces the specified results.  
Even if one could write software by 
writing specifications, in many cases—
especially cases that involve large and 
complex systems, the kinds of cases for 
which it really matters—doing so 
doesn’t seem to result in much intellec-
tual leverage, if indeed it produces any at 
all. 
This illustrates quite nicely that we often 
find ourselves in the position of wanting 
to produce epiphenomena (epiphe-
nomena, which may be very important to 
us), whose formalization as an abstrac-
tion we find to be either infeasible or not 
particularly useful. 
9.2 Bricolage as design 
The process of building one capability 
on top of another not only drives the 
overall increase in complexity, it also 
provides guidance to designers about 
how to do good design work. Any good 
designer—a developer, an architect, a 
programmer, or an engineer—knows 
that it is often best if one can take advan-
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tage of forces and processes already in 
existence as part of one’s design.  
But even before engineering, we as hu-
man beings made use of pre-existing ca-
pabilities. Agriculture and animal hus-
bandry use both plant reproduction and 
such animal capabilities as locomotion 
or material (i.e., skin) production for our 
own purposes. The exploitation of exist-
ing capabilities for our own purposes is 
not a new idea. 
An interesting example of this approach 
to engineering involves recent develop-
ments in robotics. Collins reported 
[Collins] that a good way to make a ro-
bot walk is by exploiting gravity through 
what he called passive-dynamic mo-
tion—raise the robot’s leg and let gravity 
pull it back down—rather than by direct-
ing the robot’s limbs to follow a pre-
defined trajectory. 
This illustrates in a very concrete way 
the use of an existing force in a design. 
Instead of building a robot whose every 
motion was explicitly programmed, 
Collins built a robot whose motions were 
controlled in part by gravity, a pre-
existing force.  
9.3 Infrastructure-centric devel-
opment 
Building new capabilities on top of ex-
isting ones is not only good design, it is 
highly leveraged design. But now that 
we are aware of this strategy a further 
lesson can be drawn. New systems 
should be explicitly designed to serve as 
a possible basis for systems yet to come. 
Another way of putting this is that every 
time we build a new system, it should be 
built so that it becomes part of our envi-
ronment, i.e., our infrastructure, and not 
just a piece of closed and isolated func-
tionality. 
By infrastructure we mean systems such 
as the Internet, the telephone system, the 
electric power distribution system, etc. 
Each of these systems can be character-
ized in isolation in terms of the particu-
lar functions they perform. But more 
important than the functional characteri-
zation of any of these individual systems 
is the fact that they exist in the environ-
ment in such a way that other systems 
can use them as services.  
We should apply this perspective to all 
new systems that we design: design them 
as infrastructure services and not just as 
bits of functionality. Clearly Microsoft 
understands this. Not only does it posi-
tion the systems it sells as infrastructure 
services, it also maintains tight owner-
ship and control over them. When such 
systems become widely used elements of 
the economy, the company makes a lot 
of money. The tight control it maintains 
and the selfishness with which it controls 
these systems earns it lots of resentment 
as well. Society can’t prosper when any 
important element of its infrastructure is 
controlled primarily for selfish purposes. 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is 
currently reinventing itself [Dick] to be 
more infrastructure-centric. This requires 
it to transform what is now a 
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The evocative term stovepipe is intended 
to distinguish the existing situation—in 
which the DoD finds that it has acquired 
and deployed a large number of func-
tionally isolated systems (the “stove-
pipes”)—from the more desirable situa-
tion in which all DoD systems are avail-
able to each other as an infrastructure of 
services. 
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9.4 Service refactoring and the 
age of services 
The process whereby infrastructure ser-
vices build on other infrastructure ser-
vices leads not only to new services, it 
also leads to service refactoring. The 
corporate trend toward outsourcing func-
tions that are not considered part of the 
core competence of the corporation illus-
trates this. Payroll processing is a typical 
example. 
Because many organizations have em-
ployees who must be paid, these organi-
zations must provide a payroll service 
for themselves. It has now become fea-
sible to factor out that service and offer 
it as part of our economic infrastructure.  
This outsourcing of internal processes 
leads to economic efficiencies in that 
many such processes can be done more 
efficiently when performed by special-
ized organizations. Such specialized or-
ganizations can take advantage of 
economies of scale. They can also serve 
as focal points where expertise in their 
specialized service can be concentrated 
and the means of providing those ser-
vices improved.  
As this process establishes itself ever 
more firmly, more and more organiza-
tions will focus more on offering ser-
vices rather than functions, and organi-
zations will become less stovepiped.  
We frequently speak of the “service in-
dustries.” For the most part this term has 
been used to refer to low level ser-
vices—although even the fast food in-
dustry can be seen as the “outsourcing” 
of the personal food preparation func-
tion. With our more general notion of 
service in mind, historians may look 
back to this period as the beginning of 
the age of services.  
Recall that a successful service is an 
autonomous entity. It persists as long as 
it is able to extract from its environment 
enough resources, typically money, to 
perpetuate itself. 
9.5 A possible undesirable unin-
tended consequence 
The sort of service refactoring we just 
discussed tends to make the overall eco-
nomic system more efficient. It also 
tends to improve reliability: the payroll 
service organizations are more reliable 
than the average corporate payroll de-
partment.  
On the other hand, by eliminating re-
dundancy, efficiency makes the overall 
economic system more vulnerable to 
large scale failure. If a payroll service 
organization has a failure, it is likely to 
have a larger impact than the failure of 
any one corporate payroll department. 
This phenomenon seems to be quite 
common—tending to transform failure 
statistics from a Gaussian to a scale free 
distribution: the tails are longer and fat-
ter. [Colbaugh]  Failures may be less 
frequent, but when they occur they may 
be more global. 
This may be yet another unintended and 
unexpected emergent phenomenon—a 
modern example of the tragedy of the 
commons. Increased economic effi-
ciency leads to increased vulnerability to 
major disasters at the societal-level. 
On the other hand, perhaps our growing 
realization that catastrophic failures may 
occur along with our ability to factor out 
commonly needed services will help us 
solve this problem as well. We now see 
increasing number of disaster planning 
services being offered. 
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9.6 Modeling: the difficulty of 
looking downward 
The perspective we have described 
yields two major implications for model-
ing. We refer to them as the difficulty of 
looking downwards and the difficulty of 
looking upwards. In both cases, the 
problem is that it is very difficult to 
model significant creativity—notwith-
standing the fact that surprises do appear 
in some of our models. In this section we 
examine the difficulty of looking down-
ward. In the next we consider the diffi-
culty of looking upward. 
Strict reductionism, our conclusion that 
all forces and actions are epiphenomenal 
over forces and actions at the fundamen-
tal level of physics, implies that it is im-
possible to find a non-arbitrary base 
level for models. One never knows what 
unexpected effects one may be leaving 
out by defining a model in which inter-
actions occur at some non-fundamental 
level. 
Consider a model of computer security. 
Suppose that by analyzing the model one 
could guarantee that a communication 
line uses essentially unbreakable encryp-
tion technology. Still it is possible for 
someone inside to transmit information 
to someone outside.  
How? By sending messages in which the 
content of the message is ignored but the 
frequency of transmission carries the in-
formation, e.g., by using Morse code. 
The problem is that the model didn’t in-
clude that level of detail. This is the 
problem of looking downward. 
A further illustration of this difficulty is 
that there are no good models of biologi-
cal arms races. (There don’t seem to be 
any good models of significant co-
evolution at all.) There certainly are 
models of population size effects in 
predator-prey simulations. But by bio-
logical arms races we are talking about 
not just population sizes but actual evo-
lutionary changes.  
Imagine a situation in which a plant spe-
cies comes under attack from an insect 
species. In natural evolution the plant 
may “figure out” how to grow bark. Can 
we build a computer model in which this 
solution would emerge? It is very 
unlikely. To do so would require that our 
model have built into it enough informa-
tion about plant biochemistry to enable it 
to find a way to modify that biochemis-
try to produce bark, which itself is de-
fined implicitly in terms of a surface that 
the insect cannot penetrate. Evolving 
bark would require an enormous amount 
of information—especially if we don’t 
want to prejudice the solution the plant 
comes up with.  
The next step, of course, is for the insect 
to figure out how to bore through bark. 
Can our model come up with something 
like that? Unlikely. What about the 
plant’s next step: “figuring out” how to 
produce a compound that is toxic to the 
insect? That requires that the model in-
clude information about both plant and 
insect biochemistry—and how the plant 
can produce a compound that interferes 
with the insect’s internal processes. This 
would be followed by the development 
by the insect of an anti-toxin defense.  
To simulate this sort of evolutionary 
process would require an enormous 
amount of low level detail—again espe-
cially if we don’t want to prejudice the 
solution in advance. 
Other than Tierra (see [Ray]) and its 
successors, which seem to lack the rich-
ness to get very far off the ground, as far 
as we know, there are no good computer 
models of biological arms races. A 
seemingly promising approach would be 
an agent-based system in which each 
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agent ran its own internal genetic pro-
gramming model. But we are unaware of 
any such work.46 
Finally, consider the fact that geckos 
climb walls by taking advantage of the 
Van der Walls “force.” (We put force in 
quotation marks because there is no Van 
der Walls force. It is an epiphenomenon 
of relatively rarely occurring quantum 
phenomena.) To build a model of evolu-
tion in which creatures evolve to use the 
Van der Walls force to climb walls 
would require that we build quantum 
physics into what is presumably in-
tended to be a relatively high-level bio-
logical model in which macro geckos 
climb macro walls 
It’s worth noting that the use of the Van 
der Walls force was apparently not an 
extension of some other gecko process. 
Yet the gecko somehow found a way to 
reach directly down to a quantum-level 
effect to find a way to climb walls.  
The moral is that any base level that we 
select for our models will be arbitrary, 
and by choosing that base level, we may 
miss important possibilities. Another 
moral is that models used when doing 
computer security or terrorism analy-
                                                 
46
  Genetic programming is relevant because we are 
assuming that the agent has an arbitrarily detailed 
description of how the it functions and how ele-
ments in its environment function. 
Notice how difficult it would be implement such a 
system. The agent’s internal model of the envi-
ronment would have to be updated continually as 
the environment changed. That requires a means to 
perceive the environment and to model changes in 
it. Clearly that’s extraordinarily sophisticated. Al-
though one could describe such a system without 
recourse to the word consciousness, the term does 
come to mind.  
Nature’s approach is much simpler: change during 
reproduction and see what happens. If the result is 
unsuccessful, it dies out; if it is successful it per-
sists and reproduces. Of course that requires an en-
tire generation for each new idea. 
sis—or virtually anything else that in-
cludes the possibility of creative adapta-
tion—will always be incomplete. We 
will only be able to model effects on the 
levels for which our models are defined. 
The imaginations of any agents that we 
model will be limited to the capabilities 
built into the model. 
9.7 Modeling: the difficulty of 
looking upward 
We noted earlier that when a glider ap-
pears in the Game of Life, it has no ef-
fect on the how the system behaves. The 
agents don’t see a glider coming and 
duck. More significantly we don’t know 
how to build systems so that agents will 
be able to notice gliders and duck. 
It would be an extraordinary achieve-
ment in artificial intelligence to build a 
modeling system that could notice emer-
gent phenomena and see how they could 
be exploited. Yet we as human beings do 
this all the time. The dynamism of a 
free-market economy depends on our 
ability to notice newly emergent patterns 
and to find ways to exploit them.  
Al Qaeda noticed that our commercial 
airlines system can be seen as a network 
of flying bombs. Yet no model of terror-
ism that doesn’t have something like that 
built into it will be able to make that sort 
of creative leap. Our models are blind to 
emergence even as it occurs within 
them. 
Notice that this is not the same as the 
difficulty of looking downward. In the 
Al Qaeda example one may assume that 
one’s model of the airline system in-
cludes the information that an airplane 
when loaded with fuel will explode 
when it crashes. The creative leap is to 
notice that one can use that phenomenon 
for new purposes. This is easier than the 
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problem of looking downward. But it is 
still a very difficult problem. 
The moral is the same as before. Models 
will always be incomplete. We will only 
be able to model effects on the levels for 
which our models are defined. The 
imaginations of any agents that we 
model will be limited to the capabilities 
built into the model. 
10 Concluding remarks 
10.1 Computer Science and Phi-
losophy  
• For centuries after Newton, nature was 
seen as a perfect clockwork mecha-
nism.  
• After the invention of the telephone, 
the brain was likened to a switchboard.  
Science and technology tends to shape 
our view of the world. It’s not surprising 
that the perspectives developed in this 
article reflect those of Computer Sci-
ence, the predominant perspective of this 
age. Is this parochialism? It’s difficult to 
tell from so close. One thing is clear. 
Because Computer Science has wres-
tled—with some success—with many 
serious intellectual challenges, it is not 
unreasonable to hope that the field may 
contribute something to the broader in-
tellectual community.  
It is useful to think of computers as reifi-
cation machines: they make the abstract 
concrete. As such they are similar to the 
drawing tools of an animator—who 
draws anything that crosses his or her 
mind, no matter how wild or fanciful. In 
the hands of a skilled and creative pro-
grammer,47 a computer and an associated 
                                                 
47
  We use the term programmer deliberately. Fancier 
terms like software developer (or software engi-
neer or worse information technology specialist) 
lose the focus of what is really happening when 
one creates software. A programmer (writes text 
software development environment in-
vite virtually unlimited creativity.  
But there is a major difference between 
the product produced by an animator and 
that produced by a programmer. An 
animator produces images that have 
meaning only when they enter the mind 
of another human being. They do not 
stand on their own. They are meant 
strictly as communication from one hu-
man being to another. Nor are either the 
physical medium on which the images 
are stored or the mechanisms that causes 
the images to be displayed of much sig-
nificance. The only thing that matters is 
that the images arrive as intended in the 
minds of the viewers.  
A computer program is stuck in the real 
world. It’s work is to shape the activity 
of a computer, a physical device. Many 
programs execute without even being 
observed by people—programs in cars 
and other machinery, for example. And 
even programs that perform strictly 
symbolic transformations, do work that 
may be understood as constraining the 
forces of nature (the motion of electrons) 
to some formal shape. 
To make the computer a useful reifica-
tion device—to make it possible for pro-
grammers to write text that causes a 
computer to convert programmers’ fan-
tasies to some concrete form—Computer 
Science has had to deal with some of 
philosophy’s thorniest issues. 
• Computer Science has created lan-
guages that are both formally de-
                                                                   
that) programs, i.e., shapes, the way a computer 
behaves. That’s really all that matters: what does 
the text tell the computer to do?  
In the preceding, note the stigmergy and down-
ward entailment. A program doesn’t tell a com-
puter anything. Successful programmers work 
from that perspective all the time. 
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fined—with formal syntax and seman-
tics—and operational, i.e., they actu-
ally function in the real world.  
• Computer Science has figured out how 
to represent information in databases 
in ways that allow that information to 
hang together meaningfully.  
• Computer Science has faced—and to a 
significant extent resolved—the prob-
lem of working on many levels of ab-
straction and complexity simultane-
ously.  
If insights gained from these and other 
intellectual wrestling matches can be ap-
plied in a wider context, it is only Com-
puter Science paying back the debt that 
it owes to the engineers, scientists, 
mathematicians, and philosophers who 
set the stage for and participated in its 
development. 
10.2 Constructive science 
For most of its history, science has pur-
sued the goal of explaining existing phe-
nomena in terms of  simpler phenomena. 
That’s the reductionist agenda.  
The approach we have taken is to ask 
how new phenomena may be con-
structed from and implemented in terms 
of existing phenomena. That’s the crea-
tive impulse of artists, computer scien-
tists, engineers—and of nature. It is 
these new phenomena that are often 
thought of as emergent.  
When thinking in the constructive direc-
tion, a question arises that is often under-
appreciated: what allows one to put ex-
isting things together to get something 
new—and something new that will per-
sist in the world? What binding forces 
and binding strategies do we (and na-
ture) have at our disposal?  
Our answer has been that there are two 
sorts of binding strategies: energy wells 
and energy-consuming processes. En-
ergy wells are reasonably well under-
stood—although it is astonishing how 
many different epiphenomena nature and 
technology have produced through the 
use of energy wells.  
We have not even begun to catalog the 
ways in which energy-consuming proc-
esses may be used to construct stable, 
self-perpetuating, autonomous entities. 
Earlier we wrote that science does not 
consider it within its realm to ask con-
structivist questions. That is not com-
pletely true. Science asks about how we 
got here from the big bang, and science 
asks about biological evolution. These 
are both constructivist questions. Since 
science is an attempt to understand na-
ture, and since constructive processes 
occur in nature, it is quite consistent with 
the overall goals of science to ask how 
these constructive processes work. As 
far as we can determine, there is no sub-
discipline of science that asks, in gen-
eral, how the new arise from the exist-
ing.  
Science has produced some specialized 
answers to this question. The biological 
evolutionary explanation involves ran-
dom mutation and crossover of design 
records. The cosmological explanation 
involves falling into energy wells of 
various sorts. Is there any more to say 
about how nature finds and then explores 
new possibilities? If as Dennett argues in 
[Dennett ‘96] this process may be fully 
explicated as generalized Darwinian 
evolution, questions still remain. Is there 
any useful way to characterize the search 
space that nature is exploring? What 
search strategies does nature use to ex-
plore that space? Clearly one strategy is 
human inventiveness. 
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12 Appendix. Game of Life Patterns 
 
Intuitively, a Game of Life pattern is the 
step-by-step time and space progression 
on a grid of a discernable collection of 
inter-related live cells. We formalize that 
notion in three steps.  
1. First we define a static construct 
called the live cell group. This will 
be a group of functionally isolated 
but internally interconnected cells. 
2. Then we define Game of Life basic 
patterns as temporal sequences of 
live cell groups. The Game of Life 
glider and still-life patterns are ex-
amples 
3. Finally we extend the set of patterns 
to include combinations of basic pat-
terns. The more sophisticated Game 
of Life patterns, such the glider gun, 
are examples. 
12.1 Live cell groups 
The fundamental construct upon which 
we will build the notion of a pattern is 
what we shall call a live cell group.  
A live cell group is a collection of live 
and dead cells that have two properties. 
1. They are functionally isolated from 
other live cells. 
2. They are functionally related to each 
other. 
More formally, we define cells c0 and cn 
in a Game of Life grid to be connected if 
there are cells c1, c2, …, cn-1 such that for 
all i in 0 .. n-1 
1. ci and ci+1 are neighbors, as defined 
by Game of Life, and  
2. either ci or ci+1 (or both) are alive, as 
defined by Game of Life. 
Connectedness is clearly an equivalence 
relation (reflexive, symmetric, and tran-
sitive), which partitions a Game of Life 
board into equivalence classes of cells. 
Every dead cell that is not adjacent to a 
live cell (does not have a live cell as a 
Game of Life neighbor) becomes a sin-
gleton class. 
Consider only those connectedness 
equivalence classes that include at least 
one live cell. Call such an equivalence 
class a live cell group or LCG. 
Define the state of an LCG as the spe-
cific configuration of live and dead cells 
in it. Thus, each LCG has a state. 
No limitation is placed on the size of an 
LCG. Therefore, if one does not limit the 
size of the Game of Life grid, the num-
ber of LCGs is unbounded. 
Intuitively, an LCG is a functionally iso-
lated group of live and dead cells, con-
tained within a boundary of dead cells. 
Each cell in an LCG is a neighbor to at 
least one live cell within that LCG.  
As a consequence of this definition, each 
live cell group consists of an “inside,” 
which contains all its live cells (possibly 
along with some dead cells), plus a “sur-
face” or “boundary” of dead cells. (The 
surface or boundary is also considered 
part of the LCG.) 
12.2 Basic patterns: temporal se-
quences of live cell groups 
Given this definition, we can now build 
temporal sequences of LCGs. These will 
be the Game of Life basic patterns. 
The Game of Life rules define transi-
tions for the cells in a LCG. Since an 
LCG is functionally isolated from other 
live cells, the new states of the cells in 
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an LCG are determined only by other 
cells in the same LCG.48 
Suppose that an LCG contains the only 
live cells on a Game of Life grid. Con-
sider what the mapping of that LCG by 
the Game of Life rules will produce. 
There are three possibilities. 
1. The live cells may all die. 
2. The successor live cells may consist 
of a single LCG—as in a glider or 
still life. 
3. The successor live cells may parti-
tion into multiple LCGs—as in the 
so-called bhepto pattern, which starts 
as a single LCG and eventually stabi-
lizes as 4 still life LCGs and two 
glider LCGs.  
In other words, the live cells generated 
when the Game of Life rules are applied 
to an LCG will consist of 0, 1, or multi-
ple successor LCGs.  
More formally, if  is an LCG, let Game 
of Life() be the set of LCGs that are 
formed by applying the Game of Life 
rules to the cells in . For any particular 
, Game of Life() may be empty; it may 
be contain a single element; or it may 
                                                 
48
 In particular, no LCG cells have live neighbors 
that are outside the LCG. Thus no cells outside 
the LCG need be considered when determining 
the GoL transitions of the cells in an LCG. A 
dead boundary cell may become live at the 
next time-step, but it will do so only if three of 
its neighbors within the LCG are live. Its 
neighbors outside the LCG are guaranteed to 
be dead.  
If a boundary cell does become live, the next-
state LCG of which it is a member will include 
cells that were not part of its predecessor LCG. 
contain multiple elements. If ’ is a 
member of Game of Life() write  -> ’. 
For any LCG 
 0, consider a sequence of 
successor LCGs generated in this man-
ner:  
0 -> 1 ->  2 -> 3 -> … . 
Extend such a sequence until one of 
three conditions occurs. 
1. There are no successor LCGs, i.e., 
Game of Life(i) is empty—all the 
live cells in the final LCG die. Call 
these terminating sequences. 
2. There is a single successor LCG, i.e., 
Game of Life(i) = {k}, but that suc-
cessor LCG is in the same state as an 
LCG earlier in the sequence, i.e., k = 
j, j <  k. Call these repeating se-
quences. 
3. The set Game of Life(i) of successor 
LCGs contains more than one LCG, 
i.e., the LCG branches into two or 
more LCGs. Call these branching se-
quences. 
Note that some LCG sequences may 
never terminate. They may simply pro-
duce larger and larger LCGs. The so-
called spacefiller pattern, which actually 
consists of multiple interacting LCGs, 
one of which fills the entire grid with a 
single LCG as it expands,49 is an amaz-
ing example of such a pattern. I do not 
know if there is an LCG that expands 
without limit on its own. If any such ex-
ist, call these infinite sequences. 
For any LCG 0, if the sequence 
                                                 
49
 See the spacefiller pattern on 
http://www.math.com/students/wonders/life/life.ht
ml or http://www.ibiblio.org/lifepatterns.  
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0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> … . 
is finite, terminating in one of the three 
ways described above, let seq(0) be that 
sequence along with a description of 
how it terminates. If   
0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> … . 
is infinite, then seq(0) is undefined.  
Let BP (for Basic Patterns) be the set of 
finite non-branching sequences as de-
fined above. That is,  
BP = {seq(0) | 0 is an LCG} 
Note that it is not necessary to extend 
these sequences backwards. For any 
LCG 0, one could define the pre-image 
of 0 under the Game of Life rules. 
Game of Life-1() is the set of LCGs ’ 
such that Game of Life(’) = .  
For any chain seq(0) in BP, one could 
add all the chains constructed by prefix-
ing to seq(0) each of the predecessors ’ 
of 0 ’ as long as ’ does not appear in 
seq(’). But augmenting BP in this way 
would add nothing to BP since by defini-
tion seq(’) is already defined to be in 
BP for each ’. 
We noted above that we do not know if 
there are unboundedly long sequences of 
LCGs beginning with a particular 0. 
With respect to unboundedly long 
predecessor chains, it is known that such 
unbounded predecessor chains (of un-
boundedly large LCGs) exist. The so-
called fuse and wick patterns are LCG 
sequences that can be extended arbitrar-
ily far backwards.50 When run forward 
                                                 
50
 A simple fuse pattern is a diagonal configuration 
of live cells.  At each time step, the two end cells 
such fuse or wick LCGs converge to a 
single LCG. Yet given the original defi-
nition of BP even these LCG sequences 
are included in it. Each of these un-
bounded predecessor chains is included 
in BP starting at each predecessor LCG. 
Clearly BP as defined includes many re-
dundant pattern descriptions. No attempt 
is made to minimize BP either for sym-
metries or for overlapping patterns in 
which one pattern is a suffix of an-
other—as in the fuse patterns. In a com-
puter program that generated BP, such 
efficiencies would be important. 
12.3 BP is recursively enumerable 
The set BP of basic Game of Life pat-
terns may be constructed through a for-
mal iterative process. The technique em-
ployed is that used for the construction 
of many recursively enumerable sets.  
1. Generate the LCGs in sequence.  
2. As each new LCG is generated, gen-
erate the next step in each of the se-
quences starting at each of the LCGs 
generated so far. 
3. Whenever an LCG sequence termi-
nates according to the BP criteria, 
add it to BP. 
The process sketched above will effec-
tively generate all members of BP. Al-
though theoretically possible, such a 
procedure will be so inefficient that it is 
useless for any practical purpose.51 The 
                                                                   
die; the remaining cells remain alive. A simple 
fuse pattern may be augmented by adding more 
complex features at one end, thereby building a 
pattern that becomes active when the fuse exhausts 
itself.  Such a pattern can be built with an arbitrar-
ily long fuse. 
51
  Many much more practical and efficient programs 
have been written to search for patterns in the GoL 
and related cellular automata. See 
http://www.ics.uci.edu/~eppstein/ca/search.html 
for a list of such programs. 
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only reason to mention it here is to es-
tablish that BP is recursively enumer-
able. Whether BP is recursive depends 
on whether one can in general establish 
for any LCG 0 whether seq(0) will ter-
minate.  
12.4 Game of Life patterns: com-
binations of basic patterns 
Many of the interesting Game of Life 
patterns arise from interactions between 
and among basic patterns. For example, 
the first pattern that generated an unlim-
ited number of live cells, the glider gun, 
is a series of interactions among combi-
nations of multiple basic patterns that 
cyclically generate gliders. 
To characterize these more complex pat-
terns it is necessary to keep track of how 
basic patterns interact. In particular, for 
each element in BP, augment its descrip-
tion with information describing  
a) its velocity (rate, possibly zero, and 
direction) across the grid,  
b) if it cycles, how it repeats, i.e., which 
states comprise its cycle, and  
c) if it branches, what the offspring 
elements are and where they appear 
relative to final position of the termi-
nating sequence. 
Two or more distinct members of BP 
that at time step i are moving relative to 
each other may interact to produce one 
or more members of BP at time step i+1. 
The result of such a BP “collision” will 
generally depend on the relative posi-
tions of the interacting basic patterns. 
Even though the set BP of basic patterns 
is infinite, since each LCG is finite, by 
using a technique similar to that used for 
generating BP itself, one can (very tedi-
ously) enumerate all the possible BP in-
teractions.  
More formally, let f(BP) be the set of 
all finite subsets of BP. For each mem-
ber of  f(BP) consider all possible (still 
only a finite number) relative configura-
tions of its members on the grid so that 
there will be some interaction among 
them at the next time step. One can then 
record all the possible interactions 
among finite subsets of BP.  
These interactions would be equivalent 
to the APIs for the basic patterns. We 
could call a listing of them BP-API. 
Since BP is itself infinite, BP-API would 
also be infinite. But BP-API would be 
effectively searchable. Given a set of 
elements in BP, one could retrieve all the 
interactions among those elements. BP-
API would then provide a documented 
starting point for using the Game of Life 
as a programming language.  
As in traditional programming lan-
guages, as more complex interactions are 
developed, they too could be docu-
mented and made public for others to 
use.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1. Dissipative structures vs. self-perpetuating entities 
Dissipative structures Self-perpetuating entities 
Pure epiphenomena, e.g., 2-chamber example.  Has functional design, e.g., hurricane. 
Artificial boundaries. Self-defining boundaries 
Externally maintained energy gradient. Imports, stores, and internally distributes 
energy. 
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Figure 1. Bit 3 off  and then on. 
DRAFT  2/12/2006 
Emergence Explained  66/67 
 
Figure 2. A glider 
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Figure 3. Anatomy of a hurricane. [Image from [NASA].]  
